NOTES
TEE POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
ACTING IN AN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY *
The Supreme Court of the United States has an arsenal of supervisory
powers which may be used to preserve judicial jurisdiction over issues and
to protect the interests of parties in cases which it may ultimately decide.
In addition, the Court must flexibly apply its own rules of procedure as well
as other federal procedural rules.
The heavy workload of the Court, the relative insignificance of these
matters in comparison to others before the Court, and the rapid disposition
often required, have influenced Congress and the Court to delegate authority to the individual Justices. Thus, the individual Supreme Court
Justice is presently empowered to grant bail both before and after con2
viction,' to grant stays and injunctions in both criminal and civil cases,
to grant extensions of time,3 to permit other procedural variances, 4 to issue
writs of habeas corpus and writs to show cause,5 and to take any other
action necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the Court and the rights of
parties. 6 These powers and the procedures to be followed in invoking them
are codified only partially and with little specificity. Moreover, the practices and standards applied to these applications, although gradually crystal7
lizing, may vary from Justice to Justice.
I. GENERAL PROCEDURES

A. Filing
Applications to individual Justices are processed through the office of
the clerk.8 The language of the Supreme Court Rules implies that applica* This note is the result of a field study made possible by funds provided by the
Institute of Legal Research of the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
I See text accompanying notes 45-131 infra.
2See text accompanying notes 132-206 infra.
8 See text accompanying notes 207-45 infra.
4 See text accompanying notes 255-57 infra.
5 See text accompanying notes 246-54 infra.
6 See text accompanying note 258 infra.
7A survey was made of all applications to individual Justices in the 1960 term,
and a sampling of important cases both before and after. The 1960 term was chosen
for the complete survey in order to learn the latest practices while dealing with cases
whose final appellate disposition was known. Statistics are found in the Appendices.
8 U.S. Sup. CT. R. 50(1) [hereinafter cited as "Rule"] states: "All motions and
applications addressed to individual justices shall normally be submitted to the clerk
(Emphasis added.) In practice the italicized word is superfluous. Appli."
cations submitted directly to Justices will be referred to the clerk's office for processing
except in rare cases of extreme urgency. Interview with Michael Rodak, Assistant
Clerk, in Washington, D.C., July 25, 1963.
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tions be in writing,9 and even urgent requests such as those for stays of a
capital sentence have not been accepted orally.'0 Rule 35(2) requires only
a typewritten original for motions and applications addressed to a single
justice, but this rule is relaxed for telegrams and for incarcerated laymen
without benefit of counsel."'
Upon receipt, an assistant clerk makes a preliminary examination to
see that the application is accurate and complete. With requests for extension of time, he checks the computations of the applicant and notes the dates
and the maximum extension permissible upon a form slip which will ac2
company the papers submitted to the justice.' Since applications for extension of time are ex parte, proof of service upon opposing parties is not
required. 13 All other applications must include proof of service, and in
cases in which the proof consists only of an affidavit of mailing, the clerk
may contact the opposing party to insure that notice was in fact received.
Applications for bail or stays which could have been granted by a lower
court should state the reasons for denial there, or explain why application
9 Rule 50(1) states that: "All motions and applications addressed to individual

justices shall normally be submitted to the clerk, who will promptly transmit them
to the justice concerned." (Emphasis added.)
10 In it re Robinson, not docketed, October 31, 1961 (Warren, C.J.), the clerk
wrote the following memorandum for the files:
Early in the evening of October 30th Deputy Clerk Blanchard received
a telephone call from an attorney . . . with respect to [a] . . . pending
execution. The substance of this communication was apparently a request
as to what procedure could be followed in order to obtain a stay of execution.
After checking with me, Mr. Cullinan, Deputy Clerk, telephoned the Chief
Justice, who stated that he could not act upon a telephonic request.
At about 8:00 o'clock [sic] I received a telephone call from . . . the
Western Union Office [which] . . . had received a telegram . . . making

application for a stay of execution in the same case. I communicated the
contents of the telegram to the Chief Justice, who instructed me to telegraph
Mr. Stanton refusing to interfere with the execution because of lack of
sufficient showing.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren apparently would have been willing to grant a stay based
upon the oral communication of the contents of the telegram from the telegraph
office, so that a man's life would not be sacrificed to form. But the denial of the
application, something quite unusual in cases of incomplete information, see text
accompanying notes 160-66 infra, indicates that such last minute oral requests will
not be favored.
Upon oral request, an application once denied may be submitted to another Justice.
This procedure is quite common. See, e.g., Northern v. United States, not docketed,
May 10 & May 12, 1961; cf. interview with Michael Rodak, Assistant Clerk, in
Washington, D.C., July 25, 1963.
11 There are hundreds of instances in which extensions of time to file a petition
for certiorari have been granted as the result of an application handwritten on prison
stationery. See, e.g., Castle v. United States, Misc. No. 60, 1961 Term, March 16,
1961 (Black, J.); Van Pelt v. Ragen, Misc. No. 624, 1960 Term, Dec. 9, 1960
(Clark, J.).
12 This slip presents summarily the crucial facts: the name of the case; the date
of decision below; whether it is a thirty or ninety day case; when a prior brief or
motion was filed; and a capsule summary of reasons presented for the petitioner.
13 Rule 50(2). Mr. Justice Harlan has requested proof of service. See STEm
& GRESSAIAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTicE 208 n.11 (3d ed. 1962) ; text accompanying
notes 216-18 infra.
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below was impracticable. 14 If the clerk or his assistant finds errors or
deficiencies, he may telephone petitioner's counsel or return the application with a letter suggesting the proper form. The clerk exercises great
leniency in handling mistakes in applications from indigents, laymen, or
prisoners-for example, he may contact lower courts to ascertain dates
and citations and then make needed corrections himself.15
The clerk's office has a policy of avoiding applications for extension of
time which may turn out to be unnecessary, and therefore is reluctant to
submit applications to a Justice until the urgency is evident. Thus, although Rule 50(1) states that the clerk "will promptly transmit" applications "to the justice concerned," even a technically adequate application
may be withheld until it becomes fairly certain that an extension will actually be necessary.
In meeting deadlines for filing, the judicial "day" technically ends at
midnight. However, special arrangements must be made for filing after
the close of the regular business of the clerk's office at 5:00 P.M. 16
B. Response
With the exception of ex parte applications, the clerk will hold a properly filed application for a reasonable time, in order to allow the opposing
party to file a response and/or a brief in opposition. What time is "reasonable" is within the clerk's discretion, and involves a consideration of
several factors: respondent's prior knowledge of the applications, the existence of briefs upon similar applications prepared for presentation to lower
courts, the complexity of the issues involved in the case, and the urgency
of the situation. In extreme cases, a Justice might grant a temporary stay
in order to allow additional time for the preparation of an opposing brief
and consideration of difficult questions. 17
The clerk's office will usually contact the opposing attorney or request
that petitioner do so in order to ascertain whether and when a response will
be filed. It is proper for the responding party to indicate his opposition to
the application without filing a brief in support thereof, or to admit his
acquiescence in the application on conditions proposed. The petitioner will
be given an opportunity to reply when he so requests and when time permits.
14 Rule 51 (2) requires that all applications for stays and injunctions state whether
application has been made below. FED. R. CRm. P. 38(c) seems to require a
statement of the reasons for denial below.
15 Interview with Michael Rodak, Assistant Clerk, in Washington, D.C., July 25,
1963; see, e.g., Baxter v. United States, No. 193, 1961 Term, May 26, 1961 (Stewart,
J.), in which the necessary dates were supplied to the Justice by the clerk's office,
apparently by tracing through the court of appeals the case number given in a

telegram.
16

Interview with Michael Rodak, Assistant Clerk, in Washington, D.C., July 25,

1963; see STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT Pa.cnicE 213 (3d ed. 1962).
17 See, e.g., Eckwerth v. New York, 79 Sup. Ct. 755 (1959) (Harlan, J.);
Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, not docketed, August 31, 1958
(Harlan, J.) (see 79 Sup. Ct. 4 (1958) for full disposition of stay application).
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C. Determination
1. By the Clerk
The clerk's office serves as a filter to prevent incomplete, improper, or
unnecessary applications from reaching the Justices. Proper procedural
supervision requires efficiency, flexibility, and the personal touch. The
clerk's office has ample qualifications to fulfill this role.
The clerk's office is not generally empowered to take action on the
merits of applications made to individual Justices. However, the clerk's
knowledge of the state of the docket and the argument calendar makes his
office ideally suited to act upon applications for extension of time to file
briefs in cases already pending before the Court. When such extensions
are agreeable to all adverse parties, and "in the opinion of the clerk, would
not prejudicially delay the disposition of causes not set for argument or
impede the progress of the argument calendar," Rule 34(5) authorizes
the clerk himself to grant the extension. In practice, these agreed extensions are granted only for periods up to thirty days and will not be further
8
extended without action by a Justice or the Court.' The clerk will also
withhold the mandate of the Court for a reasonable time after counsel indicates that an application for stay of mandate pending rehearing will be
19
filed, and upon timely filing, until determination thereof by a Justice.
2. By the Justice
When the application, opposition, reply, and briefs are in order, the
clerk submits them to the proper Justice. At the beginning of the term,
20
All applicaeach Justice is assigned to one or more circuits by the Court.
cases, are
federal
tions arising within a particular circuit, in both state and
which he
action
ideally submitted to the Justice assigned thereto. Any
court is
circuit
takes upon an application from a case which is pending in a
between
theoretically the action of a circuit justice. But the distinction
decision as circuit2 justice and as an individual member of the Court is
largely theoretical. '
Traditionally, a Justice is allocated a circuit with which he has had
22
some connection, or one over which the Justice whom he replaced presided.
18 Interview with Michael Rodak, Assistant Clerk, in Washington, D.C., July
25, 1963.
19 Interview with Michael Rodak, Assistant Clerk, in Washington, D.C., July
25, 1963. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Schlude, No. 629, 1960 Term, July 17, 1961
(Black, J.), in which the mandate should have been issued on July 14, but the stay
was not granted until July 17. The same policy is applied in Rule 25 cases-the
clerk will withhold notification of denials of certiorari pending timely filing or disposition of an application to stay same.
2o See 28 U.S.C. §42 (1958). The Chief Justice may make such allotments
when the Court is on vacation.
21 The distinction may have some substance, however, because FED. R. CRIM. P.
46(a) (2) provides: "Pending appeal to a court of appeals, bail may be allowed by
the trial judge, by the court of appeals, or by any judge thereof or by the circuit
justice .

.

.

."

(Emphasis added.)

But see text accompanying notes 83-86 infra.

22 For example, Justices Black, Harlan, Brennan, and Stewart have been regularly
allotted to their home circuits; Mr. Justice Goldberg replaced Mr. Justice Frankfurter and was allotted to the First Circuit.
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The Chief Justice handles applications arising from the District of Columbia
Circuit and the Fourth Circuit; one Associate Justice is assigned to both
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits; each of the others presides over one
circuit 3 Since the assignments are relatively stable from year to year,
certain Justices, particularly the Chief Justice and those assigned to the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits, handle substantially more applications than
others 2 4 Rotation of the Justices annually among the circuits would spread
the work load more evenly, and by increasing each Justice's awareness
of the policies of his associates, might further the standardization of practice.
Frequently the proper Justice is not available, either because he is
temporarily absent or disabled, or because the Court is not in session. During the summer only two or three Justices usually choose to remain in the
vicinity of Washington, D.C. The Court or the Chief Justice may determine the distribution of applications in such instances, 2 5 or a Justice who is
planning a brief absence may request that the clerk send his applications
to him or to a particular colleague. 26 The Justices have manifested concern that the proper Justice determine important applications. They have
referred applications to him when possible, 27 granted temporary stays
until he returned,28 and written short memoranda explaining their actions
on applications which would normally have been submitted to him 2 9
23 The present allotment is as follows :

Warren, C.J.
D.C. Circuit .......................
Goldberg, J.
1st Circuit .........................
2d Circuit ............................. Harlan, J.
3d Circuit .......................... Brennan, J.

4th Circuit ........................

Warren, C.J.

Black, 3.
5th Circuit ............................
Stewart, 3.
6th Circuit ..........................
Clark, J.
7th Circuit ............................
White, J.
8th Circuit ...........................
Douglas, J.
9th Circuit .........................
White, J.
10th Circuit ...........................
Allotment of the Justices, 374 U.S. iv (1963).
24 During the 1960 term the Chief Justice (District of Columbia and Fourth
Circuits) handled 100 applications, Mr. Justice Black (Fifth Circuit) 89, and Mr.
Justice Douglas (Ninth Circuit) 73. See Appendix B infra.
The other justices handled an average of 30. In more recent terms this disparity
has apparently increased, although statistics are only available on undocketed cases.
See Statistics on Applications to Individual Justices on Undocketed Cases, October
Term 1961, Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Washington, D.C.
25
Rule 50(4).
2
SInterview with Michael Rodak, Assistant Clerk, in Washington, D.C., July
25, 1963; see, e.g., Rosoto v. Warden, 11 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1963) (Douglas, J., to Harlan,
J.); Local 1545, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Vincent, not docketed, Jan. 31, 1961
(Harlan, J., to Frankfurter, J.).
(Douglas, J., to
27 See, e.g., Eckwerth v. New York, 79 Sup. Ct. 755 (1959)
Harlan, J.).
28 See, e.g., Jones v. Markway, Misc. No. 258, 1960 Term, August 2, 1960 (Frankfurter, J., stayed an extradition proceeding temporarily "until this application for a
stay may be submitted and acted upon by Mr. Justice Whittaker, The Circuit
Justice within whose Circuit the matter arises.").
29 Long Island R.R. v. New York Cent. R.R., not docketed, August 1, 1960
(Frankfurter, J., refused to enjoin the establishment of a new freight depot, and
wrote a short memorandum which he requested be sent to Harlan, J., since it was
a Second Circuit case).
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Requests by petitioners for submission of their applications to particular Justices will not be honored until the application has first been
denied by the proper Justice. Each reapplication must be specially requested after the prior denial, and reapplications are disfavored.30 Any
unfairness caused by submission of an application to an unsympathetic
Justice, whose denial prejudices subsequent applications, has been reduced
as the standards applied by the Justices become more uniform.3 ' The
alternative system of allowing petitioner to choose the Justice to whom his
application will be submitted might further imbalance the workload and
exert a natural pressure upon the Justice to act strictly on applications in
order to discourage disproportionate submissions to him.
Having received a proper application, a Justice may refer it to the
entire Court for consideration,3 2 but the volume of applications and the
Court's workload require that this option be exercised only in difficult and
significant cases.-" Many cases arise, moreover, in which the delay caused
by referral would in effect amount to a decision in favor of one party.
Rule 50(6) speaks of referral only in connection with applications for bail
or stays,3 4 and no referrals of applications for extensions of time have been
found, because they do not involve questions of law. They are granted
almost automatically. 35
In at least four instances individual Justices have circulated an application or otherwise contacted several or all of their associates, without re3o See Rule 50(5). Variations in the approach of the Justices weigh against a
rule that the first denial should be res judicata, but denial "without prejudice" is

almost never the action taken, and renewed applications rarely meet with subsequent
success. Mr. Justice Frankfurter once caught a procedural error and granted a
stay of execution after five prior applications had been denied. Burwell v. California,
76 Sup. Ct. 31 (1955) (Frankfurter, J.), reversing Rogers v. Teets, Misc. No. 262, 1955
Term, Sept. 19 (Clark, J.), Sept. 20 (Black, Reed, and Burton, JJ.), Sept. 21, 1955
(Warren, C.J.). However, out of respect for the prior denials, he apparently asked
Mr. Justice Black to grant the application which he had first denied. The Justices
frequently articulate respect for a prior determination by one of their brethren. See,
e.g., Green v. United States, Misc. No. 226, 1960 Term, July 27, 1960 (Frankfurter,
J.) ("No reason appears for overruling Mr. Justice Black's denial of bail herein.") ;
Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 25 (1960) (Douglas, J.) ("In view of my
brother WHITTAKER'S denial I was most reluctant to take contrary action."). But
cf. Cecere v. New Jersey, No. 596, 1960 Term, Dec. 22 & 27, 1960 (Brennan, J.,
denied summarily but Douglas, J., wrote: "Denied for want of a properly presented
substantial federal question.").
31 Only in the bail area do substantial variations among the attitudes of Justices
remain. See text accompanying note 45 infra.
32The power to refer is spelled out in Rule 50(6), but is probably inherent in
the judicial power under article III.
33 About 10% of stay applications are referred to the Court; other referrals are
so rare as to be insignificant. In Tomaiolo v. United States, not docketed, Nov. 21,
1961, Justice Harlan stated: "My practice in matters of this kind, in light of the
many demands upon the time of the Court, is to refer them to the Court only when
they are of such general importance or difficulty as to make that course advisable."
a4 "Any justice to whom an application for a stay or for bail is submitted may
refer the same to the court for determination." Rule 50(6).
28 U.S.C. §2101(c) (1958) and Rules 22(1), (2), 34, which authorize the
granting of extensions of time to file certiorari, mention only the individual Justice and
not the Court. Certainly, however, the full Court has power to review actions of
any of its members.
35 See text accompanying notes 207-45 infra.
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ferring the matter formally to the Court en banc 3 6 Twice the issue involved the power of a Justice to act as requestedVr Other instances of
circulation are probably rare; circulation defeats the goal of delegation of
powers to individual Justices-to lighten the workload of the Court-while
forfeiting the benefits of a conference which would result from referral.
Time permitting, views of other members of the Court are better sought
by referral, and more time can often be obtained through the grant of a
temporary stay or injunction.
The Justice may initiate further steps to obtain information before
acting on the application. He may instruct the clerk to contact lower
courts to determine whether the case will be decided in time to avoid undue
hardship to petitioner seeking bail. 38 In addition, he may sua sponte
schedule oral argument in chambers on any application.3 9 This latter practice is rare, involving at most four or five cases per term.4" Argument is
generally restricted to one or two issues which the Justice feels are not
adequately presented by the papers.
More commonly, the Justice acts upon an application within a day or
two of its submission to him. Applications for extension of time are
quickly granted almost as a matter of routine. Other applications, such as
those concerning bail or stays, may require longer periods for consideration
and have less likelihood of success. If granted, they may be conditional.
Typical conditions are those imposed to speed up the appellate process.
An application for an extension of time is usually granted by the
Justice signing an order prepared by the clerk. Other types of petitions
are granted by the Justice filing typewritten orders. Petitions are denied
by inscription of "denied" plus the Justice's signature on the first or cover
page of the application.
Having decided a bail or stay application, a Justice will often add a
sentence or two, in his own handwriting, explaining his reasons or recommending further procedures to the applicant. Such scribblings are not
officially reported. In the last decade, however,, most "opinions" and
"memoranda" filed by Justices on these matters have been reported in the
Supreme Court Reporter and the Lawyers Edition. Otherwise, short
36McGee v. Eyman, 83 Sup. Ct. 230 (1962) (Douglas, J.) ; Meredith v. Fair,
83 Sup. Ct. 10 (1962) (Black, J.); Cohen v. United States, No. 795, 1960 Term,
Oct. 21, 1960 (Douglas, J.); Noto v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 255 (1955) (Har-

lan, J.).

37 Meredith v. Fair, supra note 36, text accompanying notes 142-45 infra; Noto
v. United States, supa note 36, text accompanying notes 107-11 infra.
38 See, e.g., Green v. United States, Misc. No. 540, 1960 Term, Oct. 3, 1960
(Douglas, J., asked clerk to ascertain when Ninth Circuit would decide on appeal) ;
Bloom v. Lundburg, not docketed, Sept. 19, 1960 (Harlan, J., apparently contacted
the Connecticut Supreme Court to find out when (and possibly how) it would act
upon a motion to dismiss an appeal).
39 See, e.g., DiCandia v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 361, 362 (1958) (Harlan, J.,
was "unable to dispose of the application on the basis of the papers originally sub-

mitted .

.

") .

40 Interview with Michael Rodak, Assistant Clerk, in Washington, D.C., July
25, 1963.
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memoranda and information on action taken on these applications are
available to the lawyer only through the clerk's files in Washington. It
would seem, unless the Justice indicates to the contrary, that all such
memoranda should be printed in the official Suprene Court Reports,41 and
that, with the exception of time extensions, the action taken upon applications without opinion should be noted whenever the case next appears in the
official reports. This suggestion might require legislative action. The
Judicial Code states that "the reporter shall, under the direction of the Court
or the Chief Justice, prepare the decisions of the Court for publica1 42
Opinions of the individual justices are not decisions of
tion ....
the Court, even though in many instances the Court has in effect delegated
its decision-making authority to individual Justices.
After his decision, the Justice returns the material to the clerk's office.
The clerk then notifies the parties by letter, reporting to them the full text
of any order or memorandum. If the situation is urgent, or if counsel has
so requested, notification will be by telephone or telegram.
Bail and stays granted pending review in a lower court are usually
4
effective until final disposition of the merits of the case by that court;
bail or stays granted pending review by the Supreme Court are usually
effective until certiorari is denied or the appeal dismissed. If certiorari is
noted, such orders are effective until the
granted or probable jurisdiction
44
mandate of the Court issues.
II. BAIL

The Supreme Court rests at the pinnacle of the federal bail system, and
also possesses some supervisory power over bail determinations in state
cases in which it may or has obtained jurisdiction. These bail powers exist
to prevent the mooting of issues and to protect criminal defendants from
undue hardship. The functions of granting, reducing, increasing, or revoking bail have been delegated in the first instance to the individual Justices, although the Court may make final determinations. Only in federal
cases are the powers of the individual Justices outlined by statute and rule,
but the bulk of bail applications originate in federal cases and are thus
handled according to fairly well standardized principles. The individual
Justices have played an important role in the development of standards and
the interpretation of the rules governing bail.
41 Gf. Wiener, Opinions of Justices Sitting in Chambers, 49 LAw LIBRARY J. 2
(1956).
4228 U.S.C. §673(c) (1958). (Emphasis added.) There would be no other
obstacles to the suggested change. Budget estimates are made by the director of
the Judicial Conference, 28 U.S.C. § 605 (1958), and they must be included by the
Director of the Budget without alteration, 64 Stat. 832 (1950), 31 U.S.C. § 11(a) (5)
(1958). In appropriating money for the judiciary, Congress apportions a sum for
the printing of reports, without further qualifications. See, e.g., Judiciary Appropriations Act, 76 Stat. 1098 (1962) : "For printing and binding the advance opinions,
preliminary prints, and bound reports of the Court, $108,000."
43 One noteworthy exception is that bail pending appeal in a federal criminal case
runs until final appellate disposition. FED. R. CRIm. P. 46(a) (2).
44 Issuance of mandates is governed by Rule 59.
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Statistics covering the 1955 through 1961 terms ifidicate that only
twenty percent of applications classified as bail applications have been
granted in whole or in part by individual Justices 4 5 although there have
been notable variations among the Justices. Mr. Justice Douglas has
granted some kelief in more than forty percent of the bail applications submitted to him. In contrast, neither research nor the statistics of the clerk's
office indicate that Mt. Justice Brennan has granted relief on a single bail
application; Anong the current Justices whose practices can be categorized,
Justices Clark, Brennan, and Stewart have acted without opinion, whereas
Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Goldberg tend to explain their dispositions.
A. Federal Cases
1. Before Trial
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46, which is the keystone of the
federal bail system, provides that all persons arrested for noncapital offenses
"shall be admitted to bail." 46 This provision does iot grant the accused
an absolute right to release, however, for he may be unable to furnish a
bond for the amoUnt required.
A Supreme CoUrt Justice apparently has the power to set bail originally. 47 Section 3141 of the Criminal Code states that "bail may be taken
by any court, judge, or magistrate authorized to arrest and commit offenders
. and section 3041 provides that "the offender may, by any justice
or judge of the United States . . . be arrested and imprisoned or
bailed . . . ." 4 This is a rare instance in which the power of the
individual Justice exceeds that of the Court as a whole, and in which the
former is riot a derivative of the latter. 50 An individual Justice has apon bail questions
parently never exercised this power, as the original action
5
is taken by a federal commissioner or district judge. '
See Appendix A infra.
FF.D. R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(i).
47 FED. R. CRim. P. 46 does not list the persons empowered to grant bail before
conviction. For rioncapital offenses it says only that defendant shall be bailed. In
contrast, for capital offenses it says "by any coulrt or judge authorized by law to do
so . . . ." FED. R. CRIm. P. 46(a) (1). There is no reason to suppose that any
distinction was- intenided.
45

4 8

4818 U.S.C. §3141 (1958).

4918 U.S.C. § 3041 (1958).
(Emphasis added.)
50 Power in the Court to set bail before action below would be an unconstitutional

extension of its original jurisdiction. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803). The ban apparently does not extend to individual Justices, who traditionally rode circuit and sat in original cases.

HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL

AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 37-47 (1953). A Justice can perform administrative functions, cf. Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 583 (1962) ; HART & WECHSLER,
op. cit. supra at 102-05, so long as they do not interfere with his judicial duties.
51 There are three situations in which bail before trial is normally fixed: by a
commissioner, under FED. RL CRIM. P. 5(b), by a commissioner upon removal, under
FED. M. CRIm. P. 40(a), and by the trial court upon arraignment after indictment,
COURTS

under 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1958).
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Once bail, if any, has been set by a commissioner or by the trial court,
a motion for reduction of bail may be made at any time. An order denying
bail or the reduction thereof is an appealable "final decision." 52
Except in "proper cases," a bond is required of bailed defendants under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(d).5 The amount which may be
fixed before conviction is limited by the eighth amendment's prohibition of
"excessive bail." 5 An amount sufficient to insure the presence of the defendant at trial depends upon the financial ability of the defendant, the
nature of the crime charged, the weight of the evidence, and the character
5n
and roots of the defendant. 55 In Noto v. United States, Mr. Justice
Harlan ruled that an inference drawn from the absence of information concerning defendant's past whereabouts and activities, resulting from a claim
of privilege, was a permissible consideration only to the extent that it bore
upon the risk that defendant would not be available for trial. Since he felt
57
that the refusal to give information had been overemphasized below, he
59
8
reduced bail. The Court later agreed 5 with the reduction.
2. During Trial
Although bail, once granted, is generally continued throughout the
trial, it is unclear to what extent the right to bail becomes circumscribed
after trial has begun. While Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a) (1)
does not distinguish the trial period from the pretrial period-both being
"[Ain order
52 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958).
fixing bail can be reviewed without halting the main trial-its issues are entirely
independent of the issues to be tried-and unless it can be reviewed before sentence,
it can never be reviewed at all." Stack v. Boyle, supra at 12 (Jackson, J., concurring).
The appealability of orders concerning bail poses a problem of the interpretation
of FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(a) (2), which is discussed in text accompanying notes 107-16
infra.
53 "A person required or permitted to give bail shall execute a bond for his
appearance. One or more sureties may be required, cash or bonds or notes of the
United States may be accepted and in proper cases no security need be required."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(d).
54 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
55 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c). In contrast to the English practice, the possibility of further crime is not a proper consideration before conviction. See Foote,
Foreword: Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 685-86 (1958).
5676 Sup. Ct. 255 (1955) (Harlan, J.).
57 United States v. Noto, 226 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1955).
5S Noto v. United States, 351 U.S. 902 (1956).
59 The role of the professional bondsman has undermined traditional theories
of bail. For serious criticism of the present bail system, see Smith v. United
States, No. 17106, D.C. Cir., Aug. 15, 1963; Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d
698 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE

L.J. 966 (1961) ; cf. Note, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 693 (1958) ; Note, 102 U. PA. L. REv.
1031 (1954). Recommendations for reform have varied from the more conservative
proposed changes in Rule 46, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts (1962),
discussed in Sullivan, Proposed Rule 46 and the Right to Bail, 31 GEo. WAsH. L.
Ray. 919 (1963), to the suggestion that the bondsman be completely eliminated, and
that financial security be the exception, deposited with the court. See Note, Bail,
An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 973-74 (1961).
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"before conviction"-, prevention of activities disruptive of trial procedure
may justify revocation of bail. In Fernandez v. United States,60 fifteen of
nineteen defendants on trial for narcotic offenses were released on bail.
During the trial,6 1 the district judge revoked bail as to all fifteen, citing a
number of trial incidents, and unidentified threatening phone calls. The
Second Circuit quickly affirmed without opinion,62 and four of the fifteen
defendants then applied to Mr. Justice Harlan, apparently pending an
anticipated petition for certiorari.6 3 Since only one of the four defendants
petitioning him was connected with any of the courtroom incidents, other
factors had also delayed the trial,6 and none of the telephone calls could
have been made by the defendants, Mr. Justice Harlan expressed doubt
about the propriety of the indiscriminate revocation of bail. In deference
to the trial judge's "full 'feel' of the atmosphere," 65 and to the unanimous
affirmance by the Second Circuit, however, he denied the applications. His
extensive treatment of the problem established a strong precedent for the
proposition that special considerations may justify revocation of bail during

trial.66
3. After Conviction
The individual Justice is normally confronted with bail problems only
in this context. Pending the final appellate disposition of his case, a convicted defendant is normally released on bail by the sentencing judge,67
often on more stringent terms than before trial.6 8 While the appellant is
no longer presumed innocent, he still retains a right to appeal, and in case
of medium or short sentences, "the existence of power to grant bail is,
60 81 Sup. Ct. 642 (1961)

(Harlan, J.).
The trial began in November 1960 and ran until May 15, 1961. See United
States v. Galente, 290 F.2d 908, 909 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., dissenting).
62 The Second Circuit later produced an opinion which is found sub norn. United
States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1961), citing "an inherent authority to
61

remand . . . in the exercise of a sound discretion." Id. at 445.
63The application of defendants Galente and Ormento was filed February 14, that
of defendants Fernandez and Loiocano, February 23. Oral argument was held in
chambers on February 25. A petition for writ of certiorari was never filed, probably
because it would have been useless in that it would not have produced results before
becoming moot.
64 For example, an illness in the family of a prosecutor and a legitimate illness
of one of the defendants.
8581 Sup. Ct at 645.
66 Mr. Justice Douglas seems to have agreed in Carbo v. United States, 82 Sup.
Ct. 662, 668 (1962). But cf. 110 U. PA. L. Ray. 118 (1961).
07 Thepower to grant bail pending appeal is found in FED. R. Cium. P. 46(a) (2).
Since defendant's election under FED. R. CRIm. P. 38(a) (2) not to commence service
of sentence will not result in his release, bail is still needed. The right to bail is
coextensive with the right to appeal, and therefore limited to questions which are
nonfrivolous and raised in good faith. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 39(a), 46(a) (2); 28
§ 1915(a) (1958) (in forma pauperis).
U.S.C.
68
While the eighth amendment governs bail before conviction, Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1 (1951), it is generally said that there is no constitutional nor common-law
right to bail after conviction, see United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (1926)
(Butler, J.) ; Ex parte Harlan, 180 Fed. 119, 135 (N.D. Fla. 1909) ; United States v.
Fiala, 102 F. Supp. 899 (D. Ore. 1951) ; cf. Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277 (1895).
Such a total distinction is difficult to justify.
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indeed, essential for the protection of the right to appeal." 69 A convicted
appellant will be incarcerated unless bail is granted, and may thus serve
all or a substantial part 70 of his sentence before his appeal is decided. If
the entire sentence is served before final appellate disposition, the case
becomes moot.7 1 Defendant will have lost his opportunity to clear his name
and the courts will have allowed the mere passage of time to decide a possibly significant issue.
Thus, whenever the denial of release pending appeal would amount
in substance to a denial of the right to appeal itself, the bases for the denial,
including the amount of bond required, should be subject to careful
scrutiny. Even when those bases are sufficient in cases in which release is
denied defendants should be given an accelerated treatment in the appellate
process. The crucial element of time has been a primary concern of the
individual Justices. 72 In Albanese v. United States, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
denied an application "since the Court of Appeals is ready to hear this
appeal [in two or three week's time]

. . . and the government is pre-

Mr. Justice Douglas set an excellent example
in Green v. United States,74 when he denied a motion to reduce bail without

pared to argue it .

.

.

."

7'

69 D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (1950) (Douglas, J.).
A good example is Ellis v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. 428 (1959), in which Mr.
Chief Justice Warren granted bail of $5,000 pending an appeal of a lottery conviction
to the District of Columbia Circuit. The sentence was eight months to two years,
and had bail not been granted, defendant would have served about seven months of
the minimum eight before his appeal as of right was decided, which was more than
one year before certiorari was denied.
70 An extreme example is Farley v. United States, Misc. No. 110, 1960 Term,
Jan. 11 & 25, 1961 (Harlan, J.), in which defendant spent five years in Alcatraz
before the record was settled and his right to appeal determined. Mr. Justice Harlan
refused to consider, as denied below, a bail application which had been pending for
six months before the Second Circuit.
71 See Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960).
Mootness will not result, however,
if there is a fine accompanying the sentence.
Mootness may also be avoided by an election by the appellant not to commence
service of sentence under FEi. R. CRIM. P. 38(a) (2). This election is unattractive,
however, because he will still be incarcerated unless bail is granted, and the election
is irrevocable. Thus, if his appeal fails, he can get no credit for the time served
under his election not to serve his sentence. United States v. Carmel, 215 F. Supp.
269 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
In addition to sentences ordinarily given for misdemeanors, civil contempt citations, see, e.g., In re Bart, 82 Sup. Ct. 675 (1962) (Warren, C.J.), and criminal
contempt citations, see, e.g., United States v. Galante [sic], 298 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.
1962) ; United States v. Galente, 290 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1961) (per curiam), are likely
to produce mootness.
72 See, e.g., Tomaiolo v. United States, not docketed, Nov. 21, 1961 (Harlan, J.)
("I assume that petitioner will of course be afforded opportunity for a prompt disposition of his appeal.") ; DiCandia v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct 361 (1958) (Harlan,
J.) ("I am assuming that the Government will cooperate in effecting a prompt dispatch of petitioner's appeal.") ; Patterson v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 256 (1954)
(Frankfurter, J.) ("I assume that [the lower court will] . . . hear the appeal on
the merits as promptly as possible .... .").
73 Albanese v. United States, No. 313, 1955 Term, Dec. 20, 1954 (Frankfurter, J.).
A prior opinion in this case is Albanese v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 211 (1954)
(Frankfurter, J.).
74 Misc. No. 540, 1960 Term, Oct. 3, 1960 (Douglas, J.).
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prejudice to reapplication if the Ninth Circuit did not decide the case within
a specified time. The date was subsequently missed by one week, and
Mr. Justice Douglas reduced bail pending the filing of a petition for
75
certiorari.
While the Justices' concern with time is meritorious, their sanctions are
inadequate. The threat of eventual grant of a bail application does little to
spur the prosecution or the courts and is of little consolation to an incarcerated prisoner. A better means of accelerating appellate processes in
cases in which bail has not been granted or met would be to give immediate
priority on appellate calendars to any case in which a defendant raising substantial questions has not been released. This reform could be accomplished
by voluntary judicial action, but could also be required by state and federal
legislation.7"
a. Pending Circuit Court Review
In contrast to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a) (1), which
provides that persons arrested for noncapital crimes "shall be admitted to
bail," Rule 46(a) (2) states only that "bail imay be allowed pending
appeal or certiorari . . ." 77 and clearly defines who may grant it. If
the appeal is frivolous or taken for the purpose of delay, bail will not be
granted simply to delay the inevitable imprisonment. 78 Bail granted pending appeal runs until the final termination of all direct review unless otherwise modified or revoked. 79 Any court, judge, or Justice empowered to
grant bail may also revoke,80 reduce, impose, or vary the conditions
thereof.8 ' However, unless not practicable, an application must first have
2
been made to the trial court for any relief which it might have granted.3
Rule 46(a) (2) specifically mentions "the circuit justice" as among
those empowered to grant bail pending appeal to a circuit court..8 Stern
and Gressman, giving these words their natural meaning, interpret them as
exclusive-limiting the power to grant bail pending circuit court review to
the Justice assigned to the circuit from which the case arises.8 However,
in at least one instance bail pending appeal has been granted by a Justice
75 Whether the latter action was designed to sanction the former is not clear.
Certiorari was denied. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 804 (1961).
76FrD. R. APP. P. 9(b) (Proposed Draft, March 1964).
7
7 Fm. R. Ciam. P. 46(a) (1), (2).
(Emphasis added.)
78 Cf. Binion v. United States, 352 U.S. 1028 (1957) (per curiam); STEaN &
See generally Ward v.
GRESSmAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 402-04 (3d ed. 1962).
United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 1063 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.).
79 FED. R. CRIm. P. 46(a) (2).
The amount of bail pending review is governed
by FED. K CRIm. P. 46(c), which also applies to bail before conviction.
80 FED. R. CRim. P. 46(a) (2).
81 See STERN & GREsSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 412-13 (3d ed. 1962).
8
2 FED. R. CRIm. P. 38(c).
83

Fan. R. Caim. P. 46(a)(2).

84

SrEu &

GREssmAN, SuRME COURT PRACTICE

406 (3d ed. 1962).
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other than the circuit Justice; 85 the applicant should not be prejudiced by
the absence of the proper circuit Justice. s8
Mr. Justice Frankfurter gave Rule 46(a) (2) its first authoritative
interpretation. 87 The Rule states that bail may be allowed "unless it appears that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay." 88 The issue was
whether the word "may" meant that discretion to deny remained, absent
frivolity or delay. Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that the framers
intended the new rule to effect "a shift from putting the burden on the
convicted defendant to establish eligibility . . . to requiring the Government to persuade the trial judge that the minimum standards for allowing
bail have not been met." 89 However, he felt that the retention of the word
"may" indicated some remaining discretion even absent frivolity or delay.
He deemed the "considerable motivation .

.

. to flee . . . and . . .

ample means to accomplish this purpose," 90 cited by the trial judge, to be
one sufficient ground. Since the determination of possible flight was a
factual one, although necessarily a prophecy, he felt that an appellate judge
should not make an independent judgment upon it without a showing of
clear error below.91 Similar approaches have appeared in subsequent opinions of individual Justices,9 2 although other members of the Court have
stressed the duty of the individual Justice to make an independent judgment
when the denial below was not based upon a proper factual finding, while
affording determinations below some respect. 93
The Justices have also played an important role in limiting the considerations which may properly bear upon determinations of bail after
85 Ward v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 1063 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.) (sitting
as "ad hoc circuit justice"). In Steinberg v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 822 (1956),
bail pending review had been set at $75,000 by the Ninth Circuit. Thereafter, in a
prosecution of the same defendant within the Second Circuit, bail before trial was
set at $30,000. Mr. Justice Douglas promptly reduced bail in the Ninth Circuit case
by $30,000, effectively reversing the Second Circuit determination.
86Even if the language of the rule is strictly construed, the effect thereof can
probably be avoided by first moving to reduce bail in the circuit court, and then
filing a petition for certiorari from the denial. But that procedure raises the problem
discussed in text accompanying notes 108-16 infra.
87 The new rule had taken effect on July 8, 1956. When first presented with an
application for bail pending appeal which had been denied below, Mr. Justice Frankfurter reserved decision thereon pending reapplication below under the new standards.
United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 76 Sup. Ct. 1068 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.).
The trial judge denied bail on July 20, United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp.,
143 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), and the Second Circuit affirmed three days later,
United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 235 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1956). The present
application followed.
88 Fm. R. CRim. P. 46(a) (2).
89 Ward v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 1063, 1065 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.).
9OId. at 1066.
91 Mr. Justice Frankfurter subsequently reaffirmed this position frequently. See,
e.g., Curcio v. United States, No. 216, 1960 Term, July 20," 1960 (Frankfurter, J.) :
"I do not feel justified . . . to overrule the ruling . . . that the 'Defendants appear
to be doubtful hail risks' and must deny the application to bail." Cf. Note, 32 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 557, 574 (1957).
92 See, e.g., Tomaiolo v. United States, Misc. No. 661, 1960 Term, Nov. 21, 1961
(Harlan, J.).
13 See, e.g., Leigh v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 994, 995 (1962) (Warren, C.J.);
Reynolds v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. 30 (1959) (Douglas, J.).

1964]
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conviction. In Roth v. United States,04 an obscenity prosecution, Mr.
Justice Harlan ruled that the fact that petitioner might continue the activities for which he had been convicted could not be considered when the
constitutionality of the statute prohibiting his actions was challenged upon
96
review. 5 In Reynolds v. United States, defendant had been convicted
of wilful violation of an Atomic Energy Commission order banning ships
from an atomic testing area in the Pacific Ocean. The applicant for bail,
who had guided his small boat into the area as a protest against such
weapons, requested permission to travel to Japan in order to secure employment as an anthropologist. The district court, while granting bail in
the amount of five hundred dollars, refused permission to leave Hawaii.
The trial judge admitted that there was no reasonable doubt of defendant's
honesty, but reasoned that since he wanted to be a martyr, some suffering
was in order 97 Mr. Justice Douglas ruled this criterion improper and
granted the permission while raising the bond to one thousand dollars.
Cases like these have limited the proper considerations in setting bail
to two: the likelihood of flight and the possibility of further crime similar to
that for which defendant has been convicted. Mr. Chief Justice Warren
has reenforced these limitations by holding that the burden was upon the
Government to demonstrate one of the two factors by substantial evidence.
In Leigh v. United States,98 he held that four similar convictions (for false
checks) in the past decade were not sufficient evidence that defendant
might repeat the crime if admitted to bail, and he granted bail pending
appeal in the amount of one thousand dollars, overruling the District of
Columbia Circuit.
Mr. Justice Harlan has consistently maintained that his scope of review
is narrower when reviewing a motion to grant or reduce bail in a case pending before a court of appeals than in a case pending before the Supreme
Court.9 9 Other Justices have not discussed this problem, but the principle
seems sound-the judges or justices of a court in which a case is pending
are better able to predict applicant's chances of success therein, and it is
somewhat anomalous for one Justice to overrule decisions made by panels
of the courts of appeals, except when he is certain of error.
94 77 Sup. Ct. 17 (1956)

(Harlan, J.).
Consideration of the possibility of future crime would not have been proper in
setting bail before conviction because of the presumption of innocence, but is now
relevant, at least so long as the acts foreseen are similar to those for which the
defendant was convicted.
96 80 Sup. Ct. 30 (1959) (Douglas, 3.).
95

97 "[But] if one is going to be a crusader and a martyr, then, of course, he
embarks upon those rather hazardous enterprises with the knowledge that somewhere
along the line, if he is going to be a successful martyr, he must endure hardships.
"'. .. This is what Dr. Reynolds wanted. Now he has it. He couldn't be
a martyr unless something like this happened to him."' 80 Sup. Ct. at 32.
98 82 Sup. Ct. 994 (1962) (Warren, C.J.).
99 See, e.g., DiCandia v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 361 (1958) (Harlan, 3.);
Roth v. United States, 77 Sup. Ct 17 (1956) (Harlan, J.).
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b. Pending Supreme Court Review
Pending review in the Supreme Court, bail may be allowed "by the
court of appeals or by any judge thereof or by the Supreme Court or by a
Justice thereof." I00 As with applications to individual Justices for stays
pending the filing or disposition of certiorari, relief will not be granted
unless there is a substantial prospect that the certiorari petition will command four votes. This test is harder to meet than that of showing nonfrivolity, the requirement for bail pending appeal, but the increased difficulty
may be counteracted by a more liberal approach taken by Justices when
review is pending in the Supreme Court.""' It appears, however, that many
denials of bail applications pending certiorari, in both state and federal cases,
result from a failure to meet this test. 10 2 In Von Cseh v. New York, 1' 3 Mr.
Justice Harlan wrote upon an application which he denied because he found
no substantial prospect of certiorari being granted: "The application for
bail is denied, but without prejudice to renewal in the event that petitioner's
proposed petition for certiorari is granted by this Court." 104 An applicant
who feels a prior application may have been denied for this reason should
renew his application if certiorari is granted. 10 5

c. A Recurrent Problem
A difficult issue under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a) (2)
is whether an individual Justice has power to grant bail pending review of
appealable bail orders 16 or only when review is sought on the merits of a
case. The Supreme Court reserved decision of this question in the landmark case of Stack v. Boyle.'0 7 Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, conR. CRIm. P. 46(a) (2).
Cf. text accompanying note 99 supra.
102 See, e.g., Mokus v. United States, Misc. No. 286, 1961 Term, Sept. 6 & 15,
1961 (Warren, C.J.); Javor v. McGee, Misc. No. 31, 1961 Term, May 10, 1961
(Douglas, J.) ; Collins v. Klinger, No. 794, 1960 Term, March 28, 1961 (Douglas, J.) ;
Linnaberry v. Iowa, Misc. No. 26, 1960 Term, March 16, 1961 (Whittaker, J.)
(appeal) ; Coduto v. United States, No. 726, 1960 Term, Dec. 16, 1960 (Clark, J.) ;
Akel v. New York, 81 Sup. Ct. 25 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.). But even though a
Justice may feel that a certiorari petition has very little, if any, chance of success, he
100 FED.
I01

may grant bail pending certiorari if mootness is otherwise threatened. See Merolla v.
New York, No. 809, 1960 Term, March 10, 1961 (Harlan, J.): "I cannot say that
the federal question presented by this case is so lacking in substance that petitioner
should not be afforded an opportunity to have his petition for certiorari considered
by this Court before the sentence imposed on him is carried out." But see Bogart v.
Michigan, not docketed because moot, March 14, 1961 (Stewart, J., denied stay of
state criminal sentence).
103

No. 636, 1960 Term, Nov. 19, 1960 (Harlan, J.).

Mr. Justice Harlan has followed a similar policy in other cases. See, e.g.,
Craska v. New York, No. 877, 1960 Term, Jan. 16, 1961 (Harlan, J.) (stay denied
without prejudice to reapplication if review granted); Cohen v. Hurley, No. 84,
1960 Term, May 4 & June 20, 1960 (Harlan, J.) (stay denied and then granted after
certiorari was granted).
105 For example, see Cohen v. Hurley, supra note 104.
106 See text accompanying note 52 supra.
107 342 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1951) : "In view of our action in granting and making
final disposition of the petition for certiorari, we have no occasion to determine the
power of a single Justice or Circuit Justice to fix bail pending disposition of a petition
for certiorari in a case of this kind."
104
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curring, stated that the rule only applied to review upon the merits, without
elaborating their reasons.' 08
The problem arose again in Noto v. United States,10 9 four years later.
A petition for certiorari was filed to review a denial of a motion to reduce
bail. On application to reduce bail pending action on the petition, Mr.
Justice Harlan observed that his disposition of the matter "necessarily
involves prejudicing the very questions with which the Court must deal
should the petition for certiorari be granted," 11 but reported that he had
consulted with the other members of the Court individually, and that they
approved his granting of the application. Since haste did not appear to be
essential, it is unclear why Mr. justice Harlan followed this procedure
instead of referral to the Court for discussion in conference. The "approval" given by the Justices seriatim did not amount to a decision by the
Court that the power in question existed-the other members of the Court
may well have been acting with a view toward convenience and avoidance
of a difficult but somewhat trivial problem-yet its exercise went unquestioned. The Court subsequently granted certiorari and ordered bail reduced
to ten thousand dollars, the amount which Mr. justice Harlan had set in the
interim."' The question presented by the certiorari petition was thus not
mooted by the Justice's action.
The identical situation was handled differently by Mr. Justice Douglas
in the Bandy case." 2 Defendant sought certiorari from a denial by the
Eighth Circuit of his motion to reduce bail. Mr. justice Douglas noted
that the issue was reserved in Stack, and then disagreed with the portent
of the Court's action in Noto, stating: "if relief were granted by a single
justice, it would make the petition for certiorari moot. Therefore I think
I should not exercise the power (which seems to be present from a literal
reading of Rule 46(a) (2) . . .) in a case of that kind until the Court has
resolved the question." 113 Mr. Justice Douglas may have declined to follow
the circulation procedure used in Noto because the application was filed
in late June and the majority of the Court probably was not available. It
does not seem likely that he disapproved of circulation, since he apparently
attempted such a procedure in an earlier case 114 and has subsequently used
it in a criminal execution stay case.15
at 18 (Jackson and Frankfurter, JJ., concurring).
109 76 Sup. Ct. 255 (1955) (Harlan, J.).
"OId. at 257.
111 Noto v. United States, 351 U.S. 902 (1956).
112 Bandy v. United- States, 82 Sup. Ct. 11 (1961) (Douglas, J.).
113 Id. at 13.
114 Cohen v. United States, No. 795, 1961 Term, Oct. 21, 1960 (Douglas, J.).
108 Id.

Apparently on instructions from Mr. Justice Douglas, the application was circulated
to Justices Black and Whittaker. The circulation may have ended there because

Cohen 5 managed to raise the bond which he sought to have reduced.
11 McGee v. Eyman, 83 Sup. Ct. 230 (1962) (Douglas, J.) ; text accompanying
notes 167-75 infra. The same problem has arisen in other cases in which it was
apparently overlooked.

See, e.g., Fernandez v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 642 (1961)

(Harlan, J.); Goldfine v. United States, not docketed, Jan. 12, 1961 (Frankfurter,
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The issue should be resolved in favor of the power of the individual
justice to act, even pending review of bail determinations below. The
Justice's action can moot the entire certiorari petition in only two instances:
when the accused is convicted before the Court can act upon the certiorari
petition, and when the defendant jumps bail after his release. In the former
case, the petition would have been mooted regardless of the action of the
individual Justice, and the latter is a rare circumstance," 6 especially since a
factual determination of likelihood of flight is unlikely to be overturned by
an appellate judge. Some degree of mootness will result in almost every
case, but this inevitability is precisely the reason that the Justice ought to be
empowered to take action.
4. Upon Collateral Attack
After a final judgment of conviction and the exhaustion of direct review, a prisoner should not be released unless special circumstances are
shown." 7 The custody of prisoners during all stages of collateral attack is

governed by Supreme Court Rule 49, which provides essentially: (1) if
petitioner fails completely, he may be released or moved only for custodial
reasons; (2) if he fails only after a writ of habeas corpus or a rule to show
cause has issued and been discharged, he may be released pending review
in the discretion of the court in which the case is pending; (3) if he wins
in the trial court, he must be released and no surety need be required.""
The "initial" order respecting custody or enlargement pending review may
only be disturbed for "special reasons."
An excellent example of the role of individual Justices in the development of the law is the debate between Justices Jackson and Douglas, which
produced a clarification of the rule governing collateral attack. The old
rule had left unclear whether, pending review by a court of appeals of the
denial of a writ of habeas corpus, a single Justice had the power to grant
J.) ; Cohen v. United States, No. 795, 1961 Term, Oct. 21, 1960 (Douglas, J.). The
issue has a parallel in stay applications in which some element of mootness is necessary regardless of how the application is decided. See text accompanying notes
202-05 infra.
116 The only known case in which defendant jumped bail which had been granted

by a Justice is Williamson v. United States (the Dennis case), 184 F.2d 280 (1950)
(Jackson, J.). However, there was no mention of possibility of flight as a grounds
for denying the application, and thus Mr. Justice Jackson did not err.
117 See Brief for Appellee, Hodges v. United States, No. 50, 1961 Term, March 2,
1961 (Warren, C.J., granted bail; certiorari had been granted and there had been
several delays for which applicant was not responsible with the result that mootness
was threatened by impending completion of sentence); cf. Green v. United States,
Misc. No. 226, 1960 Term, July 27, 1960 (Frankfurter, J.).
118 See Hurst v. California, not docketed, May 9, 1963 (Douglas, J.). A federal
habeas corpus petition to obtain discharge from state confinement was successful,
but the issuance was stayed for seven days pending an appeal by the state. On
December 14, bail was set at $25,000 and reduced to $10,000 on February 8. In his
application filed May 6, petitioner pointed out that he had been incarcerated for four
years by a means held faulty in a federal court. Mr. Justice Douglas released
petitioner on personal recognizance on May 9.
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bail after a circuit judge had refused it."0 Mr. Justice Jackson believed
that he lacked that power.1 20 Mr. Justice Douglas disagreed. He emphasized
that the right to bail is often essential to an effective right to habeas corpus,
and argued that since the full Court had the power in question upon a proper
showing of special reasons, and since the full Court was not always in
session or able to act with the necessary speed, the individual Justice' must
have such a power. 121 The latter view was incorporated into the new Rule
49(4) by the words: "only where special reasons therefor are shown to the
court of appeals or to this court or to a judge or justice of either court will
[the initial order respecting the custody or enlargement of the prisoner
pending review]

.

. . be disturbed, or any order made in that regard."

122

Mr. Justice Douglas' rationale-that supervisory powers held by the Court
under a statute or article III are also exercisable by an individual Justice
when practicality so demands-may well have general validity.'l
B. State Cases
The powers of the Supreme Court and its individual members to review
bail determinations in state cases are ill-defined. If there has been a final
judgment 1 subject to Supreme Court review, two statutory provisions
give individual Justices the power to grant bail. Section 3144 of the
Criminal Code provides that when a state criminal case is pending review
in the Supreme Court, "the defendant shall not be released from custody
until a final judgment upon such review, or, if the offense be bailable, until
a bond, with sufficient sureties, in a reasonable sum, is given." 125 Section
2101(f) of the Judicial Code provides, however, that pending review on a
writ of certiorari, a Justice of the Supreme Court may stay the judgment
26
or decree of the court below, and may condition his stay upon security.'
Thus, the typical procedure is to label the bail application as one requesting
119 The ambiguous language read: "and only where special reasons therefor are
shown to this court will it disturb [the initial order respecting the custody or enlargement of the prisoner pending review] . . . or make any independent order in that
regard." U.S. Sup. CT. R. 45(4), 28 U.S.C. (1950) (now Rule 49(4)).
(Jackson, J.). Mr. Justice
120 See In re Pirinsky, 70 Sup. Ct. 232 (1949)
Jackson was agreeing with the interpretation placed upon the Rule by the First and
Second Circuits. See York ex rel. Davidescu v. Nicolls, 159 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1947) ;
United States ex rel. Thomas v. Day, 29 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1928). The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure were inapplicable because habeas corpus has traditionally been a civil proceeding. Section 1651 and the doctrine of inherent powers
were thought superseded by the Court's own rules. Mr. Justice Jackson reiterated
his position, with Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring, in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1,
17-18 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
(Douglas, J.).
121 Petition of Johnson, 72 Sup. Ct. 1028 (1952)
122 Rule 49(4).
(Emphasis added.) Compare note 119 supra.
123 Compare Rule 51(1): "Writs of injunction may be granted by any justice
in cases where they might be granted by the court."
124 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958).
125 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1958).
12628 U.S.C. § 2101 (f) (1958).
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Pending certiorari, such applications are com-

27
mon and have often been granted.1

If there has been no appealable final judgment in the state system,
there are substantial doubts as to the existence of any bail powers in either
the Court or its individual Justices. In Valenti v. Spector, Mr. Justice
Harlan denied an application for bail pending review in New York appellate
courts "for lack of jurisdiction and in any event, in the exercise of my
discretion .
128 He reasoned that neither the merits of the case nor
the action of two state judges in denying bail were reviewable by the
Supreme Court. Significantly however, he refused to rest solely on the
jurisdictional ground.
There are two possible sources for the authority of the Court or a
Justice thereof to release a defendant on bail pending further state court
proceedings. One is the "all-writs" provision, which gives the Court and,
by subsection (b), the Justices, power to issue all writs "necessary or
appropriate in aid of their [the Court's] respective jurisdiction .. .
129
This statute is probably just a restatement of authority inherent in the
article III judicial power. Otherwise states could, through lengthy appellate procedures and the imposition of short or medium sentences, infringe
upon substantial federal rights by allowing the expiration of a prison term
to moot a case before the Supreme Court could review it. 30 When necessary, therefore, the Court and the Justices probably have inherent power
over state bail determinations even before final judgments. 181
"...1,

III. STAYS

In Magnum Import Co. v. Coty,132 the Supreme Court stated,
if in its discretion, this Court conceives that upon the showing
made it should order the suspension or modification of a judgment
or decree of [a lower court]

. .

.

interlocutory or final, to pre-

serve or secure a status of the case for the full and satisfactory
127 See, e.g., Ritholz v. Michigan, No. 468, 1960 Term, July 12 & 18, 1960
(Brennan and Black, JJ.) (denied); Riela v. New York, Nos. 445, 460, 1960 Term,
Aug. 5, 1960 (Frankfurter, J.) (granted, $10,000 bond) ; Wood v. Georgia, No. 369,
1961 Term, June 20, 1961 (Black, J.) (granted). Most denials are apparently made
on the basis that there is no chance that certiorari will be granted. No instance has
been found in which such a determination was later proven incorrect.
128 Valenti v. Spector, 79 Sup. Ct. 7, 8 (1958) (Harlan, J.).
129 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1958).
130 On many of the applications pending certiorari it is apparent that mootness
is threatened. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, No. 369, 1961 Term, June 20, 1961 (Black,
J.) (twenty day sentence); Bogart v. Michigan, not docketed, March 14, 1961
(Stewart, J.) (thirty-five day sentence) ; Murphy v. Colorado, No. 672, 1960 Term,
Nov. 10, 1960 (Whittaker, J.) (thirty day sentence).
131 While Congress has power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court, U.S. CO-ST. art. III, § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1958) and 28 U.S.C.
§2101(f) (1958) appear not to be exercises of that power, and should not be so
construed absent specific statutory language.
132262 U.S. 159 (1923).
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exercise of its reviewing power over it, it may make the necessary
order of suspension or modification upon such terms as seem
equitable . . .
There is probably a constitutional basis for the power to grant stays inherent in article III. If the Court has or may have jurisdiction to decide
a case, it must also be able to keep conditions from so changing that review
becomes meaningless.
The stay of a capital sentence pending appeal 134 is the only automatic
stay in the federal system. All other stays require affirmative action beyond
the filing of papers for review on the merits. Neither the filing nor granting
of a petition for any form of Supreme Court review operates as a stay
of execution of the judgment or issuance of the mandate of a lower court.
Stays of a final judgment pending review by certiorari are authorized
specifically by section 2101(f) of the Judicial Code:
In any case in which the final judgment or decree of any court
is subject to review by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari,
the execution and enforcement of such judgment may be stayed for
a reasonable time to enable the party aggrieved to obtain a writ of
certiorari from the Supreme Court. The stay may be granted by
a justice of the Supreme Court, and may be conditioned
upon the giving of security . . . j35
There is no equivalent statutory section governing stays pending review by
appeal, which are controlled by Rule 18.136
A more general grant of power, which would seem to include injunctions and stays in any case over which the Court might obtain juris133 Id. at

163.

FED. R. CRIm. P. 38(a) (1).
13528 U.S.C. §2101(f) (1958). Since the Supreme Court is authorized under
28 U.S.C. § 1254(l) (1958) to grant certiorari "before or after rendition of judgment" by a court of appeals, the individual Justice has the power to grant a stay in
a case prior to action by the court of appeals. A Justice would probably be reluctant
to exercise this power because the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari while
cases are pending in circuit courts. One example of such action is Griffin v. County
School Bd. of Prince Edward County, not docketed, Sept. 30, 1963 (Brennan, J.);
134

see 84 Sup. Ct. 400 (1964). Rule 27 incorporates §2101(f) into the Rules of the
Court.
136 Rule 18, derived almost verbatim from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(d)
provides in part: "Whenever an appellant entitled thereto desires a stay on appeal,

he may present for approval to . . . such court when action by that court is required
by law, or . . . to a justice of this court, a motion to stay the enforcement of the
judgment appealed from .... .
Other scattered rules and statutes delineate procedure and substance as to the
filing of stay applications: Rule 51 sets out general rules, including authorization
for any Justice to grant writs of injunction which could have been granted by the
Court. For an example of this exercise, see Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry.
Co., 83 Sup. Ct. 1 (1962) (Black, J.). See also Twentieth Century Airlines v. Ryan,
74 Sup. Ct. 8 (1953) (Reed, J.).
Rule 50 sets forth the general guidelines which all applications must follow.
FED. R. Civ. P. 62, 73 and FED. R. CRim. P. 38 further amplify procedures for
stay applications.
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diction, whether or not a final judgment has yet occurred, is the "all-writs"
provision, section 1651 of the Judicial Code:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of
their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice
1 37
or judge of a court which has jurisdiction.
What constitutes a final judgment for purposes of the limitation on the
judicial power in section 2101(f) is not yet settled, although the standard
may be very broad. In United States v. FMC Corp.,13 8 an antitrust action,
the Government requested a preliminary injunction against a proposed
merger. The injunction was denied on the grounds that appropriate relief
would be available if the merger were ultimately held illegal. The District
of Columbia Circuit dismissed an appeal of this denial on the grounds that
under the Expediting Act and section 1292 (a) (1) of the Judicial Code, it
had no jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in antitrust cases.' 39 An
application for injunction was then denied by Mr. Justice Goldberg, who
noted that section 1651 was not intended to subvert specific congressional
intent, in this case the avoidance of delays in Clayton Act cases. However,
he properly reserved the question whether section 1651 would allow judicial
action if a failure to enjoin would completely frustrate the Government's
ultimate relief.
Such a broad reservation is essential for the proper functioning of the
Court. Congress probably could remove, the Court's constitutional and
statutory power under article III and section 1651 to keep a case in a
reviewable posture, but only through an express exercise of its own power
to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, 140 and absent
such express exercise the Court must be able to control cases which might
come to it.' 41 Neither the Expediting Act nor the Interlocutory Appeals
Act was apparently meant to be such an exercise.
13728 U.S.C. § 1651 (1958).
13884

Sup. Ct. 4 (1963)

(Goldberg, J.).

139 62 Stat. 989 (1948), 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958),

provides: "In every civil action
brought in any district court of the United States under any of said [antitrust] Acts,
wherein the United States is complainant, an appeal from the final judgment of the
district court will lie only to the Supreme Court." (Emphasis added.) 28 U.S.C.
§1292(a) (1) (1948) states:
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States
. . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions . . .
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.
These sections have been interpreted to mean that interlocutory orders in antitrust
cases are unreviewable.
140 Cf. It re Glaser, 198 U.S. 171 (1905) ; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506 (1869).
141 Continental Baking Co. v. City of Charlottesville, not docketed, Nov. 2, 1960
(Warren, C.J.), involved a petition to intervene in an annexation suit. The motion
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A. Vacatio4 of Stays
Meredith v. Fairi4 held that an individual Justice has the power to
vacate stays granted by lower courts or judges thereof. Meredith, a Negro,
sued for admission to the University of Mississippi, and the Fifth Circuit
held that he was entitled to the relief which he sought.143 A merry-goround of contrary orders ensued. On the state's application, a single judge
of the Fifth Circuit four times granted stays of the judgment of that court,
the first three of which were vacated by the circuit. 144 Meredith then applied to Mr. Justice Black for a stay of the order of the circuit judge. Mr.
Justice Black would have liked to refer the application in such an important
case to the entire Court, but the Court was not in session. Instead, he circulated the petition among the Justices individually in order to determine
their views on the merits of the application and the power of a Justice in
such circumstances. Thereafter, Mr. Justice Black, with the approval of his
brethren, vacated the stay. This procedure seems proper in light of the
importance of the case, the propriety of unanimous action, and the impracticability of referral.
There is no doubt that the Court itself can vacate stays granted
below.' 15 The Court's power to supervise the lower federal courts and to
preserve its authority over litigation which it may finally decide indictes
that at least when urgent situations are presented, the same power should
be exercisable by an individual justice. In effect, the action was a stay of
a stay, differing only formally from ordinary applications for stays pending
certiorari.
Rosenberg v. United States'46 held that the entire Court may vacate
a stay granted by an individual Justice. The Rosenbergs, convicted for
espionage during time of war and sentenced to die, had been before the
Court oi certiorari 147 and on three prior collateral attacks. 148 An original
to intervene was denied and an appeal was pending in the Virginia Supreme Court.
Trial of the annexation suit was scheduled before the appeal on the intervention issue
would be heard, and state law provided that the Virginia Supreme Court must issue
a final order on appeal of annexation suits and cannot remand. The application to
stay trial was rightly denied by Mr. Chief Justice Warren. If the denial of intervention could be considered a denial of due process, these state rules of procedure
probably could not prevent the Supreme Court from assuming jurisdiction. Cf.
Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920). If there was no substantial
federal question the Supreme Court would not have jurisdiction. Thus, a stay of
trial would have preserved only the jurisdiction of the Virginia Supreme Court over
the intervention appeal, and not affected the possible jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court.
142 83 Sup. Ct. 10 (1962) (Black, J.).
i43 Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1962).
144 Meredith v. Fair, 306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1962). The other vacations are
mentioned in Meredith v. Fair, 83 Sup. Ct. 10 (1962) (Black, J.).
145 See Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955) ; United States v. Ohio, 291 U.S. 644
(1934) ; Virginian Ry. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658 (1926).
143346 U.S. 273 (1953).
147 Rosenberg v. United States, 344 U.S. 838 (1952), rehearing denied, 344 U.S.
889 (1952).
148 Certiorari had been denied on an attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 965 (1953), rehearing denied, 345 U.S. 1003
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application for writ of habeas corpus was submitted to Mr. Justice Douglas
along with a request for a stay of execution. Mr. Justice Douglas did not
grant the writ of habeas corpus, but did grant the stay pending determination of the newly-raised issues by the lower courts.149 The Attorney
General applied for a vacation of the stay. The Court met in special term
and granted the motion, vacating the stay.150 The Court reasoned that since
the purpose of a stay was to keep the case intact for action by the Court,
it should be able to vacate a stay. The Court found the point of law
preserved by Mr. Justice Douglas to be insubstantial, and held that in these
peculiar circumstances it need not be litigated through the lower courts by
ordinary channels.
Only Mr. Justice Black thought that the Court lacked the power to
vacate the stay. He observed that section 2106 of the Judicial Code 151
gave the power to vacate only judgments, decrees, or orders of a court,
and that section 1651 spoke only of "writs" and did not mention dissolution of stays. However, the phrase "writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions" should not be read as limiting the Court's
power to common law writs. The purpose of granting a stay is to preserve
jurisdiction over issues and to prevent hardship to parties. Once the Court
has determined that the issues preserved are of no merit, the stay no longer
serves any valid purpose. Such a senseless 152 exception to the Court's
power should not be inferred from ambiguous congressional language. 153
B. Stays of State Court Proceedings
Section 2251 of the Judicial Code provides that a Justice or judge
before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pending may stay proceedings
against the petitioner in any state court for any matter involved in the
(1953). Two further § 2255 attacks and a motion for a writ of mandamus in the
lower courts were handled by the Court's denial of an application for stay referred
to it by Mr. Justice Jackson. Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 989 (1953).
The Court denied a petition for original habeas corpus. Rosenberg v. United States,
346 U.S. 271 (1953).
'49 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 313 (1953)
(Douglas, J.).
150 Id. at 273.
151 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1958) : "The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate
jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree
(Emphasis added.)
or order of a court .... ."
152 One commentator has stated that the Court's action in vacating the stay
granted by Mr. Justice Douglas was the "lowest point" of "the Court as an institution
.1" Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV.
. ..
The emotional background that may have led Mr. Justice Black
673, 699 (1963).
to take this restrictive position is presented in id. at 694-700.
153 The power of the individual Justice to deny stays is further qualified by
Rule 50(5), which allows reapplication to a second Justice after the original application has been denied. While a second Justice is usually loathe to overrule his
brethren, in Ex parte Stickney, Misc. No. 907, 1961 Term, Jan. 18, 1962 (Douglas,
J.), Mr. Justice Douglas granted a stay which had been previously denied by Justices
Black, Clark, Brennan, Whittaker, Stewart, and himself.
No Justice has ever vacated a stay which another Justice has granted. Such
power may well not exist, and such an inconceivable situation would require that
the Court settle the dispute. Cf. text accompanying notes 146-53 supra.
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habeas corpus proceeding.1 54 Section 2283 limits this power to situations
in which a stay is expressly authorized by Congress, or when necessary in
aid of jurisdiction. 55 Theoretically, then, a single Justice could, pending
determination of a habeas corpus petition 156 presented to him, stay connected state court proceedings. It is difficult to imagine an instance which
would warrant an exercise by a Justice of this power.
A stay of state court proceedings might be obtained differently: a
Justice might, under his general stay powers, stay state court proceedings
pending Supreme Court review of a denial of an injunction by a lower
federal court. In O'Rourke v. Levine,157 petitioner had requested a district
court to enjoin the use of wiretap evidence in a state criminal trial. The
district court granted a temporary stay which was later vacated and the
complaint dismissed. 15 8 The Second Circuit denied a stay pending appeal.
Applicant sought certiorari from that denial, and applied to Mr. Justice
Harlan for a stay. He stated:
Apart from my general practice . . . not to disturb, except
upon the weightiest considerations, interim determinations of the
Court of Appeals in matters pending before it, it would require
the most unequivocal showing of a right to immediate federal
to interfere with the conduct of a
equitable relief to persuade me
59
criminal trial in a state court.'
If such a right ever did "unequivocally" exist, it would probably be
vindicated before the case ever reached a Supreme Court Justice. This
power is thus of minimum practical importance today.
C. Criminal Stays
1. Capital Sentences
a. CurrentPractice
Applications for stays of death sentences properly occupy a favored
position in the eyes of the Justices. Unlike any other judgment, the finality
of execution is totally irreparable and noncompensable. Therefore, although the statutes and rules do not distinguish stay applications in capital
cases, the individual Justices effectively differentiate them, and grant a
stay if they consider that there is the slightest chance of Supreme Court
review. For example, in Edwards v. New York, Mr. Justice Harlan, granting a stay, remarked:
154 28

U.S.C. §2251 (1958).
15528 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958). The statute reads, "Any court . . . may not
individual justices. This section does not apply
," but the interdict includes
to stays sought by the federal government. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 220 (1957).
156 See text accompanying notes 246-54 infra.
157 80 Sup. Ct. 623 (1960) (Harlan, 3.).
158 O'Rourke v. Levine, 181 F. Supp. 947 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
159 O'Rourke v. Levine, 80 Sup. Ct. 623-24 (1960) (Harlan, J.).
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The petitioner's papers, and the record and briefs in the New
York Court of Appeals which I have also examined, leave me in
grave doubt, to say the least, as to whether petitioner's conviction
presents any substantial federal question. They also satisfy me
that petitioner was conscientiously and ably represented throughout by . . . counsel.

Nevertheless, this being a capital case, I

am constrained to give petitioner a reasonable opportunity to petition for a writ of certiorari, provided his petition is promptly
filed . ... 160
The Justices tend to grant stays of criminal executions "blindly." In
Rutherford v. Ohio,161 the application was received before the petition for
certiorari, and it contained no reference to the merits of the case and set
forth no substantial federal questions. Mr. Justice 62Stewart granted the
1
stay simply because a petition was going to be filed.
In the 1960 term, there were twenty-nine applications for stays of
capital sentences. Twelve were granted, thirteen denied, and four referred
to the Court.' ea However, of the thirteen denials, six had previously been
before the Court in some other form, and five were reapplications to another Justice after having been previously denied, as provided for in Rule
50(5). As to the other two cases, in Goldsby v. Mississippi,'6 a stay had
been initially denied by Mr. Justice Black, who upon reapplication noted,
"after amendment of the application for stay the application was submitted
to the entire Court and the stay of execution is granted." '15 The other
case was the only denial of a first application in cases which had not previously been before the Court in any other form. The denial by Mr. Justice
Black in that case was "without prejudice to application to other members
of the Court," 166 whereupon the application was presented to Justices
Whittaker, Clark, and Frankfurter, each of whom denied the stay.
16076 Sup. Ct. 538 (1956) (Harlan, J.). Edwards' stay was granted March 30,
1956. On April 19, 1956, his counsel moved for vacation of the stay without prejudice
to reapplication so that application for rehearing could be filed in the New York
state courts. New York, in opposition, pointed out that this application as much as
admitted the absence of any federal questions. In an unreported action, Mr. Justice
Harlan vacated the stay with prejudice. Petitioner was unsuccessful in the New
York courts and reapplied for a stay pending certiorari. Mr. Justice Harlan denied
the stay. Edwards v. New York, 76 Sup. Ct. 1058 (1956) (Harlin, J.).
161 Misc. No. 514, 1960 Term, Sept. 28, 1960 (Stewart, J.).
162 For -similar actions see Ferguson v. Louisiana, Misc. No. 899, 1960 Term,
Jan. 31, 1961 (Warren, C.J.) ; Kiefer v. Indiana, Misc. No. 900, 1960 Term, Jan. 30,
1961 (Clark, J.); Early v. Tinsley, Misc. No. 654, 1960 Term, Nov. 25, 1960 (Whittaker, J.) ; Whitus v. Georgia, Misc. No. 685, 1960 Term, Oct. 27, 1960 (Black, J.).
Indeed, it appears that the less information included with the application, the more
likely that a capital stay will be granted. Stays are often granted on telegrams sent
at the last minute.
163 As provided for in Rule 50(6).
164 Misc. No. 671, 1960 Term, Nov. 12, 1960 (Black, J.).
165 Ibid.
166 Scott v. California, Misc. No. 360, 1960 Term, Sept. 4, 1960 (Black, J.).
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A significant procedure was recently followed by Mr. Justice Douglas
in McGee v. Eyuzn.167 McGee was sentenced to death for first degree
murder, and the conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Arizona. 168 A petition for certiorari from that judgment alleged an
erroneous refusal to change venue and use of a statement against interest
without instructions requiring the jury to find that the statement was
voluntary. Certiorari was denied on October 8, 1962.169 Petitioner then
sought federal habeas corpus, which was denied by the district court 17D and
the Ninth Circuit. 71 Application for a stay was promptly denied by Mr.
justice Douglas on November 23, 1962, on the ground that no substantial
federal questions were presented. 172 With execution scheduled for November 30, 1962, before sunrise, a certiorari petition and a renewed stay
application were filed on November 28, the latter reaching Mr. Justice
Douglas sometime late that day. The next scheduled conference at which
the certiorari petition could be considered by the Court was at 10:00 A.M.,
November 30, after the execution was to take place. Although the issues
presented by the second application and by the certiorari petition were
identical to those raised previously, Mr. Justice Douglas, perhaps because
of the imminence of death, perhaps because certiorari had been filed, was
reluctant unilaterally to deny the stay. He circulated the petition to each
member of the Court individually. Each justice stated that he would not
vote for certiorari. Thus assuaged, Mr. Justice Douglas denied the application. 173 The Court subsequently denied certiorari, although the case
was apparently moot at the time.1 74
This procedure, while giving the appearance of benefiting petitioner,
might rather injure his position. The procedure used in McGee bypasses
the conference with its interplay of the ideas and knowledge of the participants. Two Justices alone can hear only what the other thinks, not
the interacting views of the Court. Administrative convenience, however,
167 83 Sup. Ct. 230 (1962)

(Douglas, J.).

168 State v. McGee, 91 Ariz. 101, 37 P.2d 261 (1962).
169 McGee v. Arizona, 371 U.S. 844 (1962).
170 See McGee v. Eyman, 83 Sup. Ct. 230 (1962) (Douglas, J.).
171 McGee v. Eyman, 310 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1962).
172 McGee v. Eyman, Misc. No. 189, 1960 Term, Nov. 23, 1962 (Douglas, J.).
178 Such a practice was followed in Meredith v. Fair, 83 Sup. Ct. 10 (1962)
(Black, J.), in unusual circumstances, and in the cases discussed in text accompanying
notes 106-16 supra. Aside from Meredith, only one other reported case of consultation
has been found, Noto v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 255 (1955) (Harlan, J.), in which
Mr. Justice Harlan consulted with his brethren as to the permissibility of his granting
bail pending a petition of certiorari from the denial of bail. The extent of such
consultation is not known, although there are several instances in the correspondence
files alluding to conversations between Justices on a case.
It is possible that such consultation is the top of an unreported iceberg of such
action. This impression is strengthened by the familiar attitude with which the
Justices treat such consultation when it is reported: an example is the notation by
Mr. Justice Douglas in McGee v. Eyman, 83 Sup. Ct. 230, 231 (1962) (Douglas, J.),
that, "Since a life is at stake . . . I have followed the practice in other cases (see,
e.g., Meredith v. Fair, 83 Sup. Ct. 10) and submitted the petition for certiorari to
each of my Brethren."
174 McGee v. Eyman, 371 U.S. 917 (1962).
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should be a conference on every stay application. If the
there is any chance that the certiorari petition will be
procedure would be to grant a temporary stay to allow
the certiorari petiton or the stay application by the

b. Suggested Practice
The first time a capital case comes before the Court, in any form, a
stay should be granted automatically. The restriction to cases appearing
for the first time should avoid an indefinite succession of such stays resulting from repeated collateral attacks.
The reasons for such a change are several. (1) The Justices almost
always treat applications for capital stays as though such a rule were
already in existence. (2) The rule would save the valuable time of the
Justices. (3) This procedure might save lives which need not have been
taken. Although the odds are long that petitioner will obtain review when
a stay has been refused by the lower court, the stakes are high. (4) The
burden upon the states or the federal government would be minor-the
cost of supporting a few men in death houses for an additional several
weeks. (5) Such a rule should not substantially raise the volume of
the Court's business by encouraging many additional petitions for certiorari as there are few capital cases.17 6 Almost all states 177 and the other
courts in the federal 178 system have provisions for automatic stays pending
appeal in capital cases.
2. Noncapital Sentences
A stay of a criminal sentence is similar to the granting of bail. The
standards applied to noncapital criminal stays are much stricter than those
applied to capital stay applications. In the 1960 term only fourteen percent
of such applications were granted as compared with forty-one7 9percent of the
capital stay applications. None was referred to the Court.
In Rowe v. Maine, 8 0 Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: "the grounds
on which certiorari is to be sought seem to me so wanting in substantiality that I cannot deem it a reasonable possibility that a petition for cerIn a capital stay case, any possibility
tiorari would be granted .... ,,
82
would have sufficed.'
175 For a general description of the judicial conference, see T. Clark, The
Supreme Court Conference, 19 F.R.D. 303 (1956).
176 It might be appropriate to provide that the attorney filing the application
shall do so in good faith, with sanctions. Although such sanctions are usually
ineffective, they should be available if an unmanageable problem arises.
177 Cf. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1243; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.14 (1944); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1149 (1953).
178 FED. R. CRIm. P. 38(a); see text accompanying note 134 supra.
179 Of the 44 noncapital criminal stay applications made during the 1960 term,
6 were granted, 37 denied, and I remanded to a state court for further adjudication.
See Appendix B infra.
180 Misc. No. 342, 1960 Term, Aug. 25, 1960 (Frankfurter, J.).
181 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
182 In Brinkman v. New York, Misc. No. 400, 1960 Term, July 28, 1960 (Frankfurter, J.), Mr. Justice Frankfurter set out a similar rationale in a different guise:
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D. Civil Stays
A stay in a civil case is the most difficult to obtain from an individual
Justice. In the 1960 term, while forty-one percent of capital stays and
fourteen percent of noncapital criminal stays were granted, of thirty-nine
applications for stays in civil proceedings, thirty-one were denied, three
were granted, and five referred to the Court. Four of these were denied,
one granted. Thus, of the applications acted upon only by individual
Justices, about nine percent were successful.183
In Magnum Import Co. v. Coty,184 the Court of, Appeals for the Second Circuit enjoined a trademark infringement. Although defendant
offered to post adequate bond, the court refused to stay its order pending
possible Supreme Court review. A stay application was also denied by the
Supreme Court, which outlined the general standards which have been
substantially followed in subsequent cases.18 5 Since the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction does not exist simply to insure that the loser is treated
fairly and since a large percentage of cases are denied review by the Court,
"a heavy burden rests on the applicant" 186 to show that he is entitled to
the relief he seeks. This burden is even heavier since the lower court has
considered whether the Supreme Court would be likely to grant certiorari
and whether a balance of convenience warranted suspending the decree.
"[T]his Court requires an extraordinary showing, before it will grant a
stay of the decree below pending the application for a certiorari, and even
after it has granted a certiorari, it requires a clear case and a decided balance
of convenience before it will grant such a stay." 187
The Justices have refined these principles into two tests which the
applicant must meet. There must first be a substantial prospect that in
"Not being of the view, after due consideration, that four members of this Court
would find the ground herein set forth a substantial basis for granting a petition for
certiorari, I am compelled to deny this application for stay." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, instead of requiring the mere possibility of convincing one Justice, the test for
the noncapital stay is whether there is any substantial basis for convincing four
members of the Court needed to grant a petition for certiorari.
Some Justices tend to lower their standards when the case will be rendered moot
if no stay is granted. In Conforte v. Hanna, No. 268, 1960 Term, June 24, 1960
(Douglas, J.), Mr. Justice Douglas granted a stay in a contempt case involving a
twenty-five day sentence, although grounds for the granting of certiorari were weak.
Jones v. Markway, Misc. No. 258, 1960 Term, Aug. 2, 1960 (Whittaker, J.), was
an application for stay of extradition which would have mooted the pending certiorari
petition for denial of habeas corpus. The application was granted even though
neither it nor the certiorari petition contained sufficient facts upon which to base
a judgment
183 See Appendix B infra.

These figures do not include the seven applications which requested a stay of the
issuance of the Court's own mandate pending application for rehearing under Rule
59(2). Six of these were granted and one denied. See generally text accompanying
notes 242-45 infra.
184 262 U.S. 159 (1923).
185 Deciding that the Court had power to act upon such application, Mr. Chief
Justice Taft cited Judicial Code § 262, 36 Stat. 1156 (1911) (now 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1958)) and Judicial Code §240, 36 Stat. 1157 (1911) (now 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1958)).
The former was the "all writs" clause, the latter the section of the Code giving the
Court power to review final decisions of the courts of appeal.
186Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163 (1923).
187 Id.at 164.
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certiorari cases four Justices will vote to grant certiorari, or on appeal that
the Court will note probable jurisdiction. In A. B. Chance Co. v. Atlantic
City Elec. Co.,'88 the district court ordered that certain grand jury testimony be made available to the plaintiff in a civil antitrust proceeding. The
Second Circuit had refused to review the order,' 8 9 and certiorari was pending from this denial. Mr. Justice Harlan, denying the stay application,
noted, "I am satisfied that in light of [the relevant cases] . . . and the
determinations made by the District Court, there is no reasonable expectation that certiorari will be granted by this Court with respect to the underlying question." 190 Mr. Justice Harlan's analysis is significant because
the case was rendered moot by his decision. He did not discuss this consideration, undoubtedly because the case did not meet the first hurdle-the
necessity of probability of review. 91'
The second test is that there must be some imminent and irreparable
injury to the applicant, which may be balanced against other public and
private interests which would be affected were a stay granted. This broad
test allows consideration of any factors the Justice thinks proper. If the
granting of the stay will injure the opposing party, the applicant must be
prepared to post sufficient bond. A good example of this balancing is
United States v. United Liquors Corp.,9 2 a civil suit by the Government
against an alleged monopoly of liquor distributors. The decree of the district court prohibited defendants from disseminating any pricing information to retail merchants. Defendants requested a stay of this order pending
direct appeal to the Supreme Court, alleging that the decree might force
them out of business in the interim, especially since the largest distributor
in the relevant market was not a party to the suit and not bound by the
decree. Mr. Justice Reed stated:
Weighing the economic harm and the "fear" of future irreparable injuries flowing to defendants from the existence of the
decree, during the pendency of the direct appeal to this Court,
against the public detriment which would result from a continuation of unlawful price fixing, the motion for stay is denied.' 9 3
18883 Sup. Ct. 964 (1963) (Harlan, J.).
189 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A. B. Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1963).
190 A. B. Chance Co. v. Atlantic City Elec. Co., 83 Sup. Cf. 964, 965 (1963)

(Harlan, J.).
19' In Sklaroff v. Skeadas, 76 Sup. Ct. 736, 738 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J.), a
child custody case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:
[T]he sole question before me on this motion for a stay is whether the
claims put forth on behalf of the child are so frivolous that they may not
commend themselves to at least four members of this Court as of sufficient
substance to warrant argument to determine their merit. I cannot be confident that the claims are all so devoid of substance that four members of
this Court may not wish to hear the case argued when the proposed petition
for certiorari reaches the Court.
192 77 Sup. Ct. 208 (1956)
(Reed, J.).
9
1 3 Id. at 210.
Another example of this balancing process is Local 1545, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Vincent, not docketed, Jan. 31, 1961 (Frankfurter, J.). A rival furniture
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When a Justice grants a stay, his purpose normally is to restore or
maintain the status quo pending final appellate disposition.'9 4 However, in
some instances there is no such thing as "the" status quo. For example,
in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,19 5 the state of Alaska sought to
prevent certain Eskimos from fishing with a net which threatened to deplete
the supply of fish. Decision on the stay application meant that either the
Eskimos would have to change their means of livelihood or the supply of
fish would lessen. In such a case, maintainance of the status quo is apparently impossible.
There are two types of cases in which applications for stays may require that an individual Justice effectively decide the merits of the case
itself. The first occurs when an application for stay is filed pending review
of a denial of the stay by a lower court, when such action is reviewable. In
Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County,'"6 the district court
enjoined state support for "private" all-white schools, and held that the
county's public schools could not remain closed while other public schools
in Virginia were open.197 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
vacated the judgment, holding that the district court should abstain until
the Virginia Supreme Court had interpreted the relevant state law.198
Before any action was taken by the Virginia courts, Mr. Justice Brennan
stayed the order of the Fourth Circuit pending filing of certiorari from the
decision of that court. 199 In effect, acting in his individual capacity, he
decided the exact question which would be presented to the Court in the
petition for certiorari.
union to Local 1545 had petitioned the NLRB for an election. The NLRB refused

to honor the existing contract because it contained a "hot cargo" clause, and ordered
that an election be held. Having lost in both lower courts on the merits, the union
applied for a stay of the election order pending the filing of certiorari. The NLRB
advanced five arguments for the denial of the application: there was no irreparable
damage-the election could be held at small expense and Local 1545 might win; the
delay had been too long already; even if Local 1545 lost the election they stood a chance
of regaining power should the Court grant certiorari; if the other union won, it
should be prepared to step in should certiorari be denied; and certiorari would be
denied. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, denying the application, noted:
With due regard to the merits of the decision proposed to be reviewed on
a petition for certiorari and balancing the respective equities of the parties,
on a claim of "irreparable damage," granting the application for a stay would,
under the particular circumstances here, in effect give the losing litigant
what it would have had had the Court of Appeals decided in its favor.
194 See Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 83 Sup. Ct.-1 (1962) (Black, J.),
in which Mr. Justice Black continued a lower court stay of an Interstate Commerce
Commission order allowing Southern to lower its rates. He expressly intended to
preserve the status quo.
195 80 Sup. Ct. 33 (1959) (Brennan, J.).
198375 U.S. 391 (1964).
'9f7Allen v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 207 F. Supp. 349
(E.D. Va. 1962); Allen v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 198 F.
Supp. 497 (E.D. Va. 1961).
198 Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County, 322 F.2d 332 (4th
Cir. 1963).
199 Not reported, Sept. 30, 1963 (Brennan, J.) ; see Griffin v. County School Bd.
of Prince Edward County, 375 U.S. 391, 392 (1964).
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Such action does not render the case moot, but it can cause substantial
change in position. The stay was granted on September 30, 1963, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 6, 1964, and the decision on
the merits has not yet been rendered. Such an action by an individual
Justice may foreshadow the final decision of the Court, as an individual
Justice might well hesitate before taking such significant action were he
not sure of the Court's thinking. If there is doubt as to the correct action
to be taken on the application, the best practical solution would seem to be
referral to the entire Court.2w When such referral is not practical, the
individual Justice should use extreme caution in taking affirmative action.201
A Justice's action may also render crucial issues moot, whether the
stay application is granted or denied. 20 2 A striking example is Stewart
ex rel. Nevada v. Reed.2 3 On August 9, 1960, the Supreme Court of
Nevada held that Stewart could not run in the Democratic primary which
was to take place on September 6, because he had not been affiliated with
his present party at the last election.2
An application was presented to
Mr. Justice Black on August 8, requesting a stay of the Nevada order
prohibiting the printing of Stewart's name on the ballots. The ballots were
to be printed on August 18. After that date the case would become
moot one way or the other. Since the Court was not in session, referral
was impossible. Mr. Justice Black denied the stay, probably on the ground
that there was no chance for review. Had he thought review at all likely,
he would have been faced with a difficult problem. Granting a stay would
effectively reverse on the merits the Supreme Court of Nevada. A stay in
such a case should be granted only in the extreme case of obvious error
below.205
Under Rule 50(6).
For other applications for stays pending certiorari on the denial of a stay
by the lower courts, see O'Rourke v. Levine, 80 Sup. Ct. 623 (1960) (Harlan, J.);
Stanard
v. Olesen, 74 Sup. Ct. 768 (1954) (Douglas, J.).
202
In Breswick & Co. v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 912 (1955) (Harlan, J.),
Mr. Justice Harlan held that although issuance of a stay might render moot a portion
of the appeal from a preliminary injunction, the individual Justice nevertheless has
power to so act.
203 Not docketed, Aug. 19, 1960 (Black, 3.).
204 Reed v. State, 76 Nev. 361, 354 P.2d 858 (1960).
251n re Harvey, not docketed, July 5, 1960 (Frankfurter, J.), involved an
application of the Uniform Reciprocal Witness Act between New York and Washington. A grand jury investigating corruption in Washington needed the testimony
of a New York resident and issued a certificate to New York requesting that state
to subpoena the witness along with certain records. After a hearing, the subpoena
was issued June 21, 1960 and the witness was to testify on July 11. The statute
of limitations on any crimes which might be discovered in the Washington investigation would expire before the Supreme Court would have an opportunity to consider the problem at its next session. Thus, the whole case rested squarely with
Mr. Justice Frankfurter. If he granted the stay, no prosecutions could be had, and
Washington would be harmed thereby; if the stay was not granted, the case would
be mooted because the applicant would have to testify. Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted:
Careful consideration leaves me with the firm conviction that the grounds on
which a petition for certiorari is to be made are so unmeritorious that balancing the remoteness of its being granted with the threatened mooting of
the State of Washington's proceedings, for which the books, etc. are found
to be necessary, the application for stay is denied.
200
201
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A stay may be used effectively to promote more efficient appellate
disposition of cases. In TuscaroraNation of Indians v. Power Authority,200
Mr. Justice Harlan granted a partial stay upon three conditions: that petitioner file a petition for certiorari within eleven days, that if the state did not
file its response within another eleven days a further stay might be granted,
and that if the Court itself did not act on the certiorari petition within
thirteen days after that, a further stay might be granted. Stays should be
more widely utilized for expediting and controlling cases.
IV, EXTENSIONS OF TIME
Applications for extension of time periods permitted for the filing of
various papers are the most numerous and the least important of those acted
upon by individual Justices. They outnumber all other applications combined 207 and are granted almost automatically whenever any tenable reason is presented. The most frequent are applications to extend the time
for filing petitions for certiorari, which accounted for 267 applications during the 1960 tenn.208
A. To File Petition for Certiorari
Section 2101 of the Judicial Code authorizes individual Justices to
extend time periods for filing petitions for the writ of certiorari. 2° 9 In
civil cases the time for appeal or certiorari is ninety days from the date
of final judgment below, and it may be extended up to sixty additional days
by a Justice. Section 2101(d) authorizes the Court to set time periods
for criminal cases.210 The Court has provided that ninety days are
permitted before filing a petition for certiorari to review a state court criminal judgment, which may be extended for an additional sixty days by a
Justice. 211 Thirty days are permitted before filing a petition for certiorari
to review a federal court of appeals criminal judgment, which may also be
extended for an additional thirty days by a Justice. 12 The same time limits
thereafter
govern the time for filing notice of appeals, but the sixty 21days
3
in which to docket an appeal may be indefinitely extended.
At one time an extension could not be granted after the expiration of
the statutory period2 14 However, the present Rule 34(2) provides that an
application is timely if it is presented to the clerk within the period allowed,
permitting the Justice to act after the expiration of that period.215
208 79

Sup. Ct. 4 (1958) (Harlan, J.).

See Appendix A infra.
208 See Appendix B infra.
209 28 U.S.C. § 2101 (c) (1958).
21028 U.S.C. §2101(d) (1958).
207

21

Rule 22(1).

212

Rule 22(2).

213Rules 11, 13.
214 Cresswell ex rel. DiPierro v. Tillinghast, 286 U.S. 560 (1932); Finn v. Rail-

road Comm'n, 286 U.S. 559 (1932).
215 But Rule 34(3) provides that an application once denied may not be submitted
to another Justice after expiration of the time period.
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Applications for extensions of time are ex parte and need not, with the
exception of those presented to Mr. Justice Harlan,216 contain proof of
service on opposing parties. 21 7 This rule may exist because a brief in opposition would be of little assistance to a Justice in ruling on most time
applications, which involve an evaluation of circumstances hindering petitioner, and not questions of law. Courtesy would indicate that notice should
be given. Rule 34(4) does place a duty upon the party to whom an extension has been granted to notify all other parties promptly.218 Rule 22(4)
requires that applications for extensions of time in which to file petitions for
certiorari set forth the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the Court will
be invoked, identify the judgment to be reviewed, contain a copy of the
opinion, and specifically set forth the reasons why the extension is deemed
justified. These requirements are frequently waived. For example, applications almost never include a copy of the opinion below, and are
nevertheless granted. This practice may indicate that the requirement is
needless; the merits of the case, which might be gleaned from the opinion
below, are seldom relevant in ruling on these applications. Perhaps the
requirement was intended only to insure that a reviewable judgment actually existed, but the filtering function of the clerk's office adequately per219
forms this task.
The laxity in deciding these applications is striking. Some of the reasons which have produced extensions have been: members of the professional and clerical staff of petitioner's counsel are on vacation; 2 "comes
now, the . . . petitioner and respectfully moves this honorable Court to
grant him an extension ...
,, ; 2 2 1 "because it will be impossible to complete preparation of the petition for writ of certiorari by . . . ." ;222 up2 4
coming holidays and the pressure of office and court calendars; 223 none.
Thus, the present practice really permits ninety to 150 days to file petitions
for certiorari in civil cases so long as the formality of a petition for an extension is properly executed. Although only approximately one-half of the
extensions granted are for the maximum period, 23 5 often the maximum is
21 On October 29, 1959, Mr. Justice Harlan issued a memorandum requesting
that those who apply to him for extensions of time to file petitions for certiorari
accompany them with proof of service, and that those who wish to oppose the application file a response within two days of filing. See STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 208 n.11 (3d ed. 1962). He has since relaxed that requirement in

cases in which petitioner was an incarcerated layman pro se. See, e.g., In re Weeks,
not docketed, May 29, 1961 (Harlan, J. .
217
See Rules 34(4), 50(2).
218 Rule 34(4).

See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
220 Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, No. 321, 1960 Term,
July 8, 1960 (Black, J.).
221 Campbell v. United States, Misc. No. 618, 1960 Term, Nov. 8, 1960 (Clark, J.).
222 Beck v. Washington, No. 40, 1960 Term, Nov. 18, 1960 (Douglas, J.).
219

223

224

Hohensee v. Levy, not docketed, Dec. 20, 1960 (Brennan, J.).
Fernandez v. Flint Bd. of Educ., Misc. No. 48, 1961 Term, Feb. 7,

(Stewart, J.).
225 See Appendix B infra.
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not requested, often a second extension follows, 228 and only rarely is an

extension substantially shorter than that requested.
Some applications may deserve very receptive treatment, such as those
of incarcerated petitioners who are not represented by counsel, and who
may find legal materials incomprehensible or unavailable. Of sixty-seven
such applications in the 1960 term, only one was denied.227 Absent such
circumstances, the general tendency automatically to grant extensions conflicts with the policy of the statute and rules establishing time periods. An
attempt to remedy the situation was made in 1954 by amending Rule 22(4)
to provide that "such applications are not favored." But in Knickerbocker
Printing Corp. v. United States,2 8 its futility was foreshadowed. An extension was requested because the attorney's office was engaged in various
other cases. Mr. Justice Jackson noted that prior to the 1954 revision,
"delayed justice [had] , . . become little less than scandalous . . . 229
and argued that the amendment should place a heavy burden on the applicant. He felt the reason advanced by the applicant was not sufficient,
since the business of the Court should not be postponed because of inefficient management of a law office. Nevertheless) because of the novelty
of the rule, Mr. Justice Jackson thought it would have been harsh to deny
all relief and therefore granted a twenty day extension with a warning to
future applicants within his circuit. Since then a little leniency has bred a
little more leniency, no Justice wishing to deny an application when one of
his brethren had granted a similar one. By the 1955 term, despite the
amendment, 224 out of 238 applications were granted, at least in part; and
during the 1961 term, 275 out of 282 were similarly granted.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter was the lone dissenter from the rubber-stamp
policy on these applications. In Brody v. United States, 30° he stated his
position forcefully. "Important reasons of public policy lie behind time
limits, and extensions should be granted only in

.

. . exceptional cir-

cumstances in which the policy behind the general rule is properly to be
subordinated to a more compelling policy," 2 31 presumably that of not penalizing excusable neglect or genuine hardship. Certiorari petitions are not
briefs, he emphasized, and require only an elaboration of reasons why the
case should be reviewed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter repeatedly urged that
"barring , . . exceptional situations, the responsibility of counsel to litigation in this Court should take precedence" over all other litigation.P 2 Even
226 See, e.g., Kemp v. California, No. 361, 1961 Term, June 12, July 26 & Aug.
21, 1961 (Douglas and Black, JJ.) ; Mason v. California, No. 797, 1960 Term, Jan. 14
& Feb. 15, 1961 (Douglas, J. and Warren, C.J.).
227 See Appendix B infra. Mr. Justice Frankfurter accounted for the lone
denial in Duncan v. Payson, not docketed, Dec. 5, 1960 (Frankfurter, J.).
2- 75 Sup. Ct 212 (1954) (Jackson, J.).
229

Ibid.

23

Id. at 911.

23 77 Sup. Ct. 910 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.).
(Frankfurter, J.). He also
repeatedly granted applications for seven to ten days when maximums were requested.
See, e.g., Flores v. Prann, No. 709, 1960 Term, Jan. 31, 1961; Portsmouth Baseball
Corp. v. Frick, No. 314, 1960 Term, Aug. 4, 1960; Lana v. New York, No. 270,
1960 Term, July 20, 1960.
232 Carter v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 911 (1955)
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the Government, whose applications are usually successful, felt the sting
of his strict position. For example, in United States v. Consolidated
Edison Co.,2 3 3 the Government had requested an extension of twenty days

because certain individuals who must review and authorize the filing of
certiorari petitions were absent from Washington. Mr. Justice Frankfurter denied the application, commenting:
With all due allowance to the necessarily slow movements of
governmental action, it will of course not be claimed that it is
suffering from creeping paralysis, and ninety days would seem to
be ample time to decide whether a petition for certiorari should be
filed in a case presenting a square conflict, in a tax case, with the
23 4

Court of Claims.

The position of Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems most appropriate.
Preparation of a certiorari petition should not normally take more than a
week, and the business of the Supreme Court should come before other
litigation. While no hard and fast standards may be promulgated because
of potential justifiable extenuating circumstances, the present practice
ignores the policy of the statutes and rules. Perhaps incarcerated laymen
and counsel with thirty-day federal criminal cases involving difficult legal
problems should be given special consideration. In addition, such reasons
as unpredictable printing delays, sudden illness of a lawyer not associated
with a firm, or difficulties in obtaining printed records should be recognized.
But certainly extensions should not he granted simply because counsel
"has been away from the office on vacation .

.

.

." 25

Perhaps the more desirable policy meets administrative difficulties:
there seems to be a natural reluctance on the part of most justices to be
stricter than any of their colleagues; moreover, the sanction-refusal of
review, is somewhat extreme in view of the violation-tardiness. If, for
whatever reason, the present policy is to continue, then the justices should
not be bothered with these applications. There is no reason why the
clerk's office cannot apply the lax standards. The clerk is well aware of
the state of the docket, and is probably closer to the bar and better able
to evaluate day-to-day problems of lawyers.23 6 Even today the clerk's
office 'prepares a short memorandum on all applications for the Justice,
which includes the maximum extension permissible, the extension requested,
and a summary of the reasons presented in the application. Although it
appears that the Justice reads over the application, he also seems to rely
No. 357, 1960 Term, Aug. 16, 1960 (Frankfurter, J.).
Ibid. Not surprisingly, the Government's petition was filed on time on Aug.
23, 1960. And it was adequate; certiorari was granted. United States v. Consolidated Edison Co., 364 U.S. 890 (1960).
235 Massengale v. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n, Misc. No. 296, 1961 Term, June 8, 1961
(Stewart, J.) (granted).
236 The clerk's office is empowered, under Rule 34(5), to grant agreed extensions
of time for filing briefs under limited circumstances, which itself requires full knowledge of the calendar.
233
234
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upon the memorandum from the clerk. This change would relieve the
Justices of a trivial but time-consuming job, which requires little judicial
reasoning or analysis. In addition, it would insure that an application
would not be treated differently depending upon the circuit from which it
arose.
B. Other Time Extensions
Petitions for extensions of time in filing other types of papers are also
granted almost automatically, They involve, briefly: (1) the docketing of
an appeal; 2 (2) the filing of motions to dismiss or affirm, and answers
thereto; 238 (3) the filing of the record on appeal; 239 (4) the filing of answers to petitions for certiorari; 240 (5) the filing of briefs on the merits; 241
and, (6) the filing of petitions for rehearing2 2 As to petitions for rehearing, whenever a party seeks a rehearing after his petition for certiorari has
been denied, he must apply to a Justice to stay the clerk's notification to the
court below2 4 3 If he seeks rehearing after any other decision, he must file
a petition within tventy-five days, unless the time is shortened or enlarged
2
by the Court or a Justice thereof. " Timely filing of a petition for rehearing automatically stays the issuance of the Court's mandate under
Rule 59(2), except when the twenty-five day period expires during the
Court's vacation, which normally begins in late June. Then the petitioner
must simultaneously apply to a Justice for a stay of the Court's mandate
pending disposition of the petition for rehearing. Since these stays are in
fact granted automatically, 2 45 the exception in Rule 59 has become nothing
more than a trap for the unaware.
V. MISCELLANEOUS POWERS

The remaining powers which are or may be possessed by an individual
Supreme Court Justice are ill-defined, subject to some doubt, and at
present, of no practical importance.
23TRules 11, 13.
238 Rule 16 provides that a motion to dismiss or affirm must be filed within thirty
days of receipt of the jurisdictional statement, and that an appellant has twenty days
in which to file such a motion. Although the Rules do not state that these times
may be extended, the Justices consider such power inherent in the Court and therefore in 1hemselves. Interview with Michael Rodak, Assistant Clerk, in Washington,
D.C., July 25, 1963; see, e.g., Hyam v. Upper Montgomery Joint Authority, No. 150,
1960 Term, Aug. 2, 1960 (Black, J.) (granted); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs,
Inc., No. 203, 1960 Term, July 22, 1960 (Black, J.) (granted).
23
9 FED. R. CRIm. P. 38(c).
24 Rule 24(1).

241 Rules 34, 41.
242 Rules 25(2), 58,
24
3 See Rule 25(2).

59(2).

244 Rule 59(2).
245 See, e.g., Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 478, 1960 Term, June 30, 1961
(Black, J.) ; Gonzales v. United States, No. 416, 1959 Term, July 8, 1960 (Clark, I.).
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A. Habeas Corpus
An individual Justice is authorized by statute to grant writs of habeas
corpus and writs to show cause 24 6 The statute requires that an application made to a Supreme Court Justice must state the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant
is held.24 7 The individual Justice is also empowered to transfer any ap24 8
No unconplication made to him to the appropriate district court.
Court
Supreme
the
upon
jurisdiction
stitutional conferring of "original"
jurisdiction
corpus
habeas
involved;
or any of its Justices 249 is necessarily
is "appellate" so long as applicant has been committed by some judicial
authority:
The decision that the individual shall be imprisoned must always precede the application for a writ of habeas corpus, and this
writ must always be for the purpose of revising that decision, and,
therefore, appellate in its nature. 2Debates over the exact bases of this power, and over what constitutes
"judicial" authority, 251 are academic. Neither the Court nor any Justice
252
thereof has granted a writ of habeas corpus for more than three decades.
In United States ex rel. Norris v. Swope,25 Mr. Justice Douglas, while
noting that he had the power to consider an application for habeas corpus
on its merits, stated that:
I do not think it would be appropriate, absent a showing of
individual Justice . . .
exceptional circumstances . . . for an
2
to entertain the petition on the merits. Neither the Supreme Court nor
forum for original habeas corpus
would original habeas corpus in
a single Justice would probably

a single Justice thereof is an appropriate
proceedings. Only in an exceptional case
the Supreme Court be granted, and then
refer the application to the entire Court.

24628

U.S.C. §§2241(a), 2243 (1958).

24728
248 28

U.S.C.

§2242,

114 (1958).

U.S.C. § 2241(b) (1958).

249 See generally Oaks, The "Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme

Court, in 1962 SuPRF-uE COURT REVIEW 153, 154-59 (Kurland ed.).
250EX parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807).
251 See Oaks, supra note 249, at 167-68.
252 See id. at 153.
25372 Sup. Ct. 1020 (1952) (Douglas, J.).
2

at 1021. Even in the other world of race relations, the Justices have
54Id.
refused to wield the sacred writ. See, e.g., It re Wykoff, not docketed, July 26,

1961 (Black and Clark, JJ., jointly as only Justices available), reported in 6 RAcE
REL. L. REP. 794 (1961-1962).
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B. Power To Waive Application of Supreme Court Rules
In Shelton v. United States, 5 although no further time extension was
permissible, Mr. Justice Frankfurter permitted an applicant to file one copy
of a corrected page proof of a petition for certiorari, instead of the forty
printed copies normally required, 25 6 on condition that the forty printed
copies be filed two days later. Petitioner's counsel had been unavoidably
absent from his office for two weeks and upon his return found that several
corrections upon the printer's brief would greatly improve the petition.
This example is the only one of its kind discovered 57 The power to waive
Supreme Court Rules in cases of excusable neglect or unavoidable minor
lateness would seem to be inherent in the Court's power to promulgate its
own rules and to administer them. Of course, such action of an individual
Justice must be reviewable by the Court.

C. A Section 1651 Residuum
There probably remain "anunknown group of powers, as yet undefined,
which a single Justice might exercise whenever the Court itself is unable
to act. For example, a Justice might issue injunctions or writs of mandamus during the summer to insure the effectiveness of Court decisions.
The basis for these powers would be the all-writs provision, section 1651,258
and the inherent judicial powers in article III of the Constitution.
Frank Fellemant
John C. Wright, Jr.
2

MNo. 9, 1961 Term, July 18, 1960 (Frankfurter, J.).

2-56 Rule 21 (1).
257 In Breswick & Co. v. United States, No. 36, 1956 Term, Jan. 11, 1957 (Warren, C.J.), Mr. Chief Justice Warren denied a motion to postpone oral argument.
Individual Justices, notably the Chief Justice, have such powers, which do not involve

suspension of the Rules.
25828 U.S.C. § 1651 (1958).

t LL.B. 1964, University of Pennsylvania.
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ALL APPLICATIONS TO INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES IN THE 1960 TERm FOR EXTENIONS OF
TIME OTHER THAN EXTENSIONS TO FILE PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI.

Total
Grantedas
Applications Requested
Warren, C. J.
Black, J.
Frankfurter, J.
Douglas 3.
Clark, J.
Harlan, J.
Brennan, J.
Whittaker, J.
Stewart, J.
TOTALS

Percent

28
20
8
12
12
10
3
10
8

26
15
5
12
12
10
2
8
7

111
100

97
87.4

Granted
in Part

Denied

Denied as
Untimely

0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
1

2
1
3
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

ALL APPLICATIONS TO INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES IN THE 1960 TERM FOR
MISCELLANEOUS RELIEF.

Warren, C. J.
Frankfurter, J.

Douglas, J.

1 Application for vacation of prior order, granted.
1 Application for waiver of the rules of the Court, granted.
2 Applications for original habeas corpus, denied.

2
1.8

